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LIMITS OF PRIVATE ORDERING




From standardized contracts for loans, repurchase
agreements, and derivatives, to stock exchanges and alternative trading
platforms, to benchmark interest and foreign exchange rates, private
market structures play a number of important roles within modern
financial markets. These market structures hold out a number of
significant benefits. Specifically, by harnessing the powerful incentives
of market participants, these market structures can help lower
information, agency, coordination, and other transaction costs,
enhance the process of price discovery, and promote greater market
liquidity. Simultaneously, however, successful market structures are the
source of significant and often overlooked market distortions. These
distortions-or limits of private ordering-stem from positive network
externalities, path dependency, and power imbalances between market
participants at the core of these market structures and those at the
periphery. Somewhat paradoxically, these limits can erect substantial
barriers to entry, insulate incumbents from vigorous competition, and
undermine the emergence of new and potentially more desirable
substitutes, thus entrenching less efficient market structures. Using the
London Interbank Offered Rate ("Libor") and the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association determination committee ("DC")
mechanism as case studies, this Article seeks to better understand the
limits of private ordering. It also explores how relatively modest
changes to the public regulatory regimes governing these market
structures could, in some cases, yield significant improvements.
*Associate Professor of Law and Finance, Oxford University.
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L Introduction
Imagine we permitted referees to place bets on the sporting
events they officiated.' On one level, this would almost certainly offend
our sense of fair play.2 On another level, however, we might ultimately
view this as unproblematic insofar as teams were able to freely contract
with those referees willing to make credible commitments not to exploit
the inherent conflicts of interest, and so long as compliance with these
contracts was relatively easy to monitor and enforce. Imagine now,
however, that there exists a limited number of qualified referees, that
these referees coordinate in the development of a standardized contract
that does not prohibit betting on games, and that they collectively enjoy
sufficient market power to ensure that these contracts receive
widespread adoption. Imagine further that the costs of determining
whether a referee had in fact wagered on a game are extremely high
1 In conducting research for this Article I discovered that the journalists at FT
Alphaville beat me to the punch in utilizing this metaphor. See Lisa Pollack,
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and, as a corollary, that there exists little or no credible threat of either
private contractual enforcement or market-based reputational sanctions.
Given these additional facts, we might be of the view that this state of
affairs is likely to undermine confidence in the integrity of the game.
Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that professional sports leagues
prohibit referees from wagering on games.3 It seems remarkable,
therefore, that we permit this type of activity in the most high stakes
game of all: finance.4
Conventional economic theory views market participants as
possessing high powered incentives to invest in the development of
private market structures-e.g. contracts, rules, and other governance
mechanisms-which enable them to make credible commitments.5
These incentives, it is argued, can be seen as driving both the creation
and structure of markets in a wide variety of contexts: from physical
marketplaces such as the Pike Place Fish Market or Aalsmeer Flower
Auction, to virtual ones such as eBay, StubHub, and Etsy.6 These
incentives are a product of the fact that it is the market participants
themselves who stand to capture the majority of the benefits generated
by these innovations. These benefits flow principally from the
reduction of information, agency, coordination, and other transaction
costs. Through the reduction of these costs, successful market structures
can be understood as creating a virtuous circle: lower transaction costs
attract more market participants; more market participants result in
' The rles of the National Basketball Association, National Football League,
and Major League Baseball, for example, prohibit referees from betting on
games. Indeed, referees have even gone to prison for betting on games. See,
e.g., Howard Beck & Michael S. Schmidt, Former N.B.A. Referee Pleads
Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at D1.
' See Pollack, supra note 1 ("Isda picks the members of a committee that
determines who has won and lost in the game of credit derivatives by selecting
those who have the greatest potential to be conflicted.").
5 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 57-58 (1990); see also Avner Greif, Contract
Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi
Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 535 (1993); Paul R. Milgrom et
al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant,
Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 5 (1990); Oliver
E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1983); Oliver E. Williamson, The New
Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 595, 601-02 (2000).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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more transactions; more transactions generate valuable price and other
information; and more and better information lowers transaction costs,
thereby attracting even more market participants.7 In effect, these
market structures constitute an important part of what Douglass North
characterized as the "rules of the game," which give market participants
confidence in the integrity of the marketplace.8
Private market structures play a number of particularly
important roles within modem financial markets. For example,
standardized contracts for loans, repurchase agreements, and
derivatives reduce legal uncertainty, lower negotiation and drafting
costs, facilitate the aggregation and dissemination of new learning
about best market practices, and promote greater market liquidity.9
Stock, commodity, and derivatives exchanges match buyers and sellers
and ensure the dissemination of valuable price and trading information,
thereby lowering information and search costs, enhancing the process
of price discovery, and-once again-promoting greater market
liquidity.'0 Benchmark interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and
commodity prices lower information, negotiation, and coordination
costs within the decentralized, opaque, and relatively less liquid
markets for loans, over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives, and other
sophisticated financial instruments." In each case, market participants
developed these market structures, at least in part, with a view to
capturing the gains from trade stemming from the cheaper, deeper, and
more liquid markets which these structures helped to make possible.
Simultaneously, however, successful market structures are also
the source of significant and often overlooked market distortions. These
distortions stem from positive network externalities, path dependency,
and pronounced power imbalances between the market participants at
the core of these market structures and those at the periphery.12 In many
7 See infra text accompanying notes 43-47.
8 North, supra note 5, at 3.
9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (8th ed. 2011);
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV.
713,719-29 (1997).
1o See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 94 (2003); Daniel R. Fischel
& Sanford J. Grossman, Customer Protection in Futures and Securities
Markets, 4 J. FUTUREs MKTS. 273, 292 (1984); J. Harold Mulherin et al.,
Prices are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a
Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. &ECON. 591, 593 (1991).
11 See infra text accompanying notes 120-21, 239-40.
12 See infra Part II.
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cases, these distortions are exacerbated by market opacity, thus
undermining the credible threat of either effective contractual
enforcement or market-based reputational sanctions. Collectively, these
distortions can erect substantial barriers to entry, insulate incumbents
from vigorous competition, and undermine the emergence of new and
potentially more desirable substitutes, thus entrenching less efficient
market structures. Somewhat paradoxically, then, the success of these
market structures may ultimately make them more prone to
opportunistic behavior, thereby undermining efficient private
contracting, welfare enhancing innovation, and market confidence.
These distortions thus represent important limits on the desirability of
private ordering as a means of structuring financial and other markets.
The limits of private ordering are likely to be most problematic
where a core group of market participants not only writes the rules of
the game, but is also responsible for interpreting and enforcing them. In
such cases, these core market participants play a role analogous to that
of the hypothetical referees: determining issues in which they may have
an important and undisclosed stake.13 In the absence of the credible
threat of effective private contractual enforcement or market-based
reputational sanctions, these core market participants may be able to
exploit this privileged position without risking widespread defection by
those at the periphery. This, in turn, provides a potentially powerful
justification for some form of public regulatory intervention designed to
constrain the scope for opportunistic behavior.
The objective of this Article is to better understand the limits of
private ordering within modem financial markets. It examines these
limits through the lens of two case studies. The first case study is the
so-called "Big Bang" Protocol developed by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association ("ISDA"). 14 More specifically, this Article
examines the determination committee ("DC") mechanism introduced
by the Big Bang Protocol in order to facilitate the adjudication of
certain contractual issues arising in connection with ISDA's widely
used credit default swap ("CDS") documentation. The Big Bang
Protocol has brought much needed standardization and predictability to
what was often a chaotic process for settling many CDS contracts upon
the occurrence of bankruptcy, restructuring, and other events involving
the issuers of the underlying credit instruments.15 On the other hand,
however, the parties responsible for resolving contractual issues under
13 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
14 See infra Part 111.b.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 205-10.
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the DC mechanism-principally global derivatives dealers-are also
counterparties to the vast majority of these contracts.16 These same
dealers also play an influential role in the governance of ISDA. 17 This
market structure gives rise to hardwired conflicts of interest, putting
dealers in essentially the same position as the hypothetical referees.'8
As we shall see, these conflicts are not adequately addressed by ISDA's
existing contractual documentation or governance arrangements.19
Moreover, given the relative opacity of both CDS markets and dealer
balance sheets, it is unrealistic to rely on the threat of market-based
sanctions to fully constrain dealer opportunism.
20
In order to shed further light on the problems embedded within
this market structure, as well as why private ordering is unlikely to
effectively address them, this Article draws a number of significant
parallels between the DC mechanism and a second case study: the now
infamous London Interbank Offered Rate ("Libor"). 21 Developed by
the British Bankers' Association ("BBA"), Libor is a set of benchmark
interest rates which notionally reflect the price at which a selection of
panel banks are able to raise funds from other banks in the London
money market.2 2 Like the DC mechanism, Libor has played an
important role in the standardization of derivatives, credit, and a great
many other markets.23 Simultaneously, however, Libor panel banks are
important participants within these markets.24 This, combined with the
opacity of many of the markets in which Libor is utilized as a
benchmark, opens the door to potential opportunistic behavior.25
Moreover, the governance of Libor-which until recently was overseen
by the BBA and relied on the unverified submissions of panel banks-
has historically done very little to constrain the prospect of
oppommism.26 At the same time, the success of Libor has generated
positive network externalities and path dependencies, which-despite
longstanding concerns about Libor's integrity-make it costly for
16 See infra text accompanying note 211.
17 See infra text accompanying note 216.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 216-23.19 See infra text accompanying notes 216-23.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 216-20.
21 See supra Part V.
22 See supra Part IV.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 237-42.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 245-50.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 245-50.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 245-49.
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market participants to create or switch to alternative benchmarks. As a
result, panel banks have been able to exploit the structural weaknesses
of Libor without destabilizing the prevailing equilibrium. The scale of
this exploitation is perhaps most clearly reflected in the fact that, since
June 2012, public regulatory authorities in the United States, United
Kingdom, European Union, and elsewhere have imposed
approximately $6.3 billion in fines on at least ten panel banks stemming
from findings of fraud and market manipulation in connection with
Libor and other benchmark rates.27
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins by briefly
explaining the logic underpinning the desirability of private ordering.
This logic is premised on the powerful incentives of market participants
to develop innovative market structures that lower transaction costs,
thereby enabling them to make more credible commitments and
generate gains from trade. Part II also describes in theoretical terms the
limits of private ordering: positive network externalities, path
dependency, and power imbalances. These limits-both on their own,
but especially in combination-can impede the market-driven process
of innovation from which the prospective benefits of private ordering
flow. Part III then shifts the focus to our first case study: the Big Bang
Protocol and, more specifically, the DC mechanism. It begins by
describing the role played by ISDA in developing standardized legal
documentation, coordinating international law reform, and
spearheading other initiatives on behalf of the global OTC derivatives
industry. It then examines in greater detail the mechanics of both the
Big Bang Protocol and the DC mechanism, along with their prospective
transaction cost benefits, latent costs, and the potential for opportunistic
behavior. Part IV then examines the origin and basic mechanics of
Libor, before briefly chronicling the ongoing scandal stemming from
investigations by public regulatory authorities in several jurisdictions
that uncovered widespread fraud and market manipulation. Drawing on
the insights from these parallel examinations, Part V then returns to the
limits of private ordering and examines how positive network
externalities, path dependency, and the core/periphery structure
associated with ostensibly successful market structures such as Libor
and the DC mechanism can also render them uniquely susceptible to
abuse. Part VI then canvasses a small number of relatively modest,
27 See infra text accompanying notes 270-72 for a more detailed breakdown of
these fines, the institutions on which they were imposed, and the regulators that
imposed them.
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straightforward policy prescriptions that might be employed to limit the
scope for such abuse. Part VII concludes.
There are two principal insights at the heart of this Article.
First, the parallels between Libor and the DC mechanism-the key
players, privileged market positions, prevailing incentive structures, and
the absence of strong internal and external governance mechanisms-
collectively suggest that the DC mechanism is vulnerable to the same
type of opportunistic behavior which has undermined market
confidence in the integrity of Libor. Second, and more broadly, while
market participants may often possess powerful incentives to invest in
the development of private market structures, they may also possess
equally powerful countervailing incentives. Therefore, when evaluating
the most desirable role for both private ordering and public regulatory
intervention, we must first seek to understand how and why specific
markets work-and sometimes don't-in practice.
I. The Logic and Limits of Private Ordering
28
We use private market structures on almost a daily basis.
Whenever one buys fresh strawberries at a farmers market, purchases a
used coffee table on eBay, or compares the prices of package vacations
on Expedia, he or she is using a private market structure. The benefits
of these market structures flow principally from the reduction of
information, agency, coordination, and other transaction costs.29 eBay's
"Top Rated Seller" certification, for example, provides prospective
buyers with useful information about the historical trading behavior of
otherwise anonymous counterparties.30 Expedia and other price
comparison websites, meanwhile, aggregate information from different
suppliers, thereby enabling consumers to compare different products
and thus be more confident that they are getting a good deal.
2' As employed in this Article, the term "market structure" can be understood
as a subspecies of what Douglass North describes as "institutions." See
Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991). The defining
feature of market structures as "institutions" is thus that their purpose is to
facilitate market interactions. See id.
29 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937).
30 See Daniel W. Elfenbein et al., Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value
of Quality Certification 11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 20074, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20074.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/4ZER-S8RU.
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The strengths of these market structures as a form of economic
organization reflect the strengths of private ordering more generally
and, ultimately, of free markets themselves. These strengths flow from
the incentives of economic actors to invest in the acquisition of
information and expertise, reduce transaction costs, and make credible
commitments with the objective of capturing the resulting gains from
trade.31 First, under competitive conditions, we would expect private
ordering to result in product differentiation, with the supply of market
structures reflecting the range of consumer demand.32 Second, the
market-based nature of private ordering arguably makes these market
structures both sensitive and, importantly, responsive to changing
information and circumstances.33 We would thus expect to observe an
ongoing process of experimentation and updating with new
information, changing market dynamics, or technological
advancements, for example, spurring the development of new and
progressively more desirable market structures. Put simply, we would
expect market structures to continually evolve in order to minimize
transaction costs.34 For these reasons, private ordering is often viewed
31 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Conversely, where the market
anticipates that a market participant will be unable to make credible
commitments, we would expect this market participant to bear the wealth
effects stemming from this failure. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 341 (1976).
12 An analogous argument has been made with respect to the provision of
private regulation. Cf Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus
Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 417 (2006);
David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 442 (2003); Paul
G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1997).
"3 See ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 65
(1999); Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55
S. ECON. J. 644, 650 (1989); Cally Jordan & Pamela Hughes, Which Way for
Market Institutions: The Fundamental Question of Self-Regulation, 4
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 211 (2007); Snyder, supra note 32, at 422-24. But
see Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1711-25 (1996).
" For a survey of scholarly work examining this hypothesis, see generally
Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An
Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1
(2008).
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as enhancing choice, innovation, and efficiency relative to other forms
of economic organization.3 5
Many market structures are developed by entrepreneurs
looking to satisfy the pent-up demand of market participants.36 Others,
however, are developed by market participants themselves. In theory,
market participants possess powerful incentives to invest in the
development of market structures. Sellers of high quality goods and
services understandably want to find ways of signaling this quality to
potential buyers, whether through the production of information,
contractual terms, or reputational mechanisms.37 Typically, they also
want to make these goods and services available to as many potential
buyers as possible.38 Buyers, for their part, want access to information
about sellers, the goods and services they are selling, and prevailing
market prices.39 Buyers also want access to markets populated with
multiple potential sellers, thereby enabling them to compare different
products and prices.40 Simultaneously, they may want access to
different products and services from the same seller or marketplace.
More broadly, both buyers and sellers want to economize on the
information, search, negotiation, drafting, and other transaction costs
necessary to consummate transactions.4'
Almost by definition, a "successful" market structure would be
one that satisfies these demands, enabling market participants to reduce
transaction costs and make more credible commitments to one
35 See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without
Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1155, 1161-62 (1998) ("[Private ordering]
significantly reduces the costs of communicating and collecting information
regarding individuals' preferences. It also facilitates fast and cost-effective
information processing that allows real-time feedback on public preferences
and choices.").
36 See, e.g., Hardening All Round, 6 ECON. &POL. WKLY. 1368 (1971).
37 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).
31 Cf Martin Grieger, Electronic Marketplaces: A Literature Review and a
Call for Supply Chain Management Research, 144 EuR. J. OPERATIONAL REs.
280, 287 (2003).
39 See, e.g., Bruce M. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and
Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 933
(1977).
40 Indeed, sellers may want this as well as it makes it less costly for them to
determine the products and prices offered by their competitors. See Grieger,
supra note 38, at 87.
41 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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another.42 We would expect these market structures to attract a large
number of market participants, increasing both the depth and volume of
trade.43 More buyers and sellers completing more transactions would
then serve to enhance the process of price discovery,44 thereby reducing
the difference (or "spread") between bid and asking prices,45 and
generating greater market liquidity.46 Greater liquidity, in turn, would
attract even more market participants, thus further enhancing price
discovery, reducing spreads, and generating even more liquidity. For
this reason, it is often said that "liquidity begets more liquidity.47 The
incentives of market participants to develop and use these market
structures thus flow from their desire to extract some of the potential
gains from trade associated with this virtuous circle, as illustrated in
Figure 1.48
42 See Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for
Competition Policy?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 111, 114.
" The "depth" of trade refers to the number of buyers and sellers in the
marketplace. The "volume" of trade, in contrast, refers to the number of
completed transactions.
" Distilled to its essence, price discovery is the process by which buyers and
sellers determine the price of an asset in the marketplace. See HARRIS, supra
note 10, at 94.
15 Id. The "bid price" represents the maximum price that a buyer is willing to
pay for an asset. "Bid" Price, SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/bid.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/59BU-ZBWT. The "ask price"
represents the minimum price that a seller is willing to sell it for. Id.
46 The concept of liquidity is vely abstract and, thus, difficult to define. See
generally Sanford J. Grossman and Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market
Structure, 43 J. FIN. 617 (1988). At a vely basic level, however, it can be
understood as a measure of a market participant's ability to trade rapidly and
with minimal price impact. See id. at 618. It is thus a function of both the
amount of time it takes to buy or sell an asset and the effect of the transaction
on its price. See id.
17 John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Jeff Gordon, Colin Mayer &
Jennifer Payne, Principles of Financial Regulation (2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
48 See Bennett, supra note 42, at 114.
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For all their benefits, however, successful market structures are
also the source of significant and often overlooked market distortions.
The remainder of this section examines three of the most important of
these distortions: positive network externalities, path dependency, and
power imbalances between the market participants at the core of these
market structures and those at the periphery.
A. Positive Network Externalities
The virtuous circle described above is the source of potentially
significant positive network externalities.49  Positive network
externalities arise wherever the addition of new users-or market
participants in our case-generate benefits for existing users.° The
telephone and credit cards are both good examples, as are social
networks such as Facebook. Where there is only one user, these
"network goods"5' possess little value (imagine how valuable a
telephone would be if you were the only person amongst your friends
and family who used one). As we increase the number of new users,
however, some of the value thereby generated accrues to earlier
" Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, The New "Emergence Economics"
of Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for Communications Policy, 7 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217, 221 (2009).
50 See Paul Klemperer, Network Goods (Theory), in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 915, 915 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E.
Blume eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
51 Id.
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adopters.52 This has a number of implications. First, once the number of
users reaches a certain critical mass, network goods tart to generate
their own gravity: with new users attracted not only by the inherent
quality of the good itself, but also (and perhaps even only) by the fact
that it is widely used.53 This, in turn, generates an acute coordination
problem, rendering it extremely difficult for new and potentially more
desirable substitutes to emerge and take hold in the marketplace.54
Second, while from a static perspective the existence of strong positive
network externalities might suggest that aggregate welfare would be
maximized under monopolistic market conditions (again, imagine if all
your friends and family were on the same phone network),55 from a
dynamic perspective these externalities represent potential barriers to
welfare enhancing innovation.56 There exists a considerable body of
scholarship examining the impact of network externalities in different
contexts.57 Most notably for our present purposes, everal scholars have
examined whether network externalities result in the "lock-in" of
suboptimal contractual terms in standardized contracts.58 Stephen Choi
52 See id.
51 See id. ("[N]etwork effects create incentives to 'herd' with others.... [A]
network that looks like [it is] succeeding will as a result do so.").
51 Id. at 916. Facebook users will be familiar with this coordination problem.
While privacy concerns or advertisements might motivate us to switch to a
different social network, this strategy entails significant private costs unless a
sufficiently large proportion of our friends and family also switch to the same
alternative network at the same time. There is thus a distinct first-mover
disadvantage that disincentivizes us from switching networks. Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP.
93,108 (1994).
55 This assumption sets aside the obvious distributional implications.
56 See Klemperer, supra note 50, at 915.
51 See generally Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am.
ECON. REV. 332 (1985); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 54; S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 133 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the
Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990). For a discussion of the role of law in
overcoming network effects, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network
Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 277, 322-48 (2003).
58 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
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and Mitu Gulati, for example, using a dataset of sovereign bond
issuances between 1994 and 2003, trace the migration from so-called
"unanimous action" clauses to "collective action" clauses following
Ecuador's and Uruguay's successful use of exit consents in 2000 to
restructure its outstanding sovereign debt.59 The authors find that,
absent an "interpretive shock," network externalities play a role in
locking in potentially suboptimal terms such as universal action
clauses.6 ° Indeed, even after the interpretive shock generated by these
countries' successful use of exit consents, the authors document that the
CAL. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (1985); Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate
Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1040, 1079-80 (2002); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 9, at 762; Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 808-12 (1995); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 973-74 (1993).
59 See generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929
(2004); see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics
of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu
Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign
Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 140-43 (2012). Very briefly, unanimous
action clauses require the unanimous consent of all bondholders to any
restructuring of payment terms, while collective action clauses simply require
the consent of a specified majority or supermajority. See FED. RESERVE BANK
OF S.F., FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER No. 2004-06, RESOLVING SOVEREIGN
DEBT CRISES WITH COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES 1 (2004). An exit consent,
meanwhile, enables bondholders to exchange their existing bonds for new
bonds. Id. at 2-3. In order to participate in the exchange, however, bondholders
must agree to vote in favor of a resolution amending the existing bonds in a
way that greatly diminishes their value. Id. at 2-3.
60 Choi & Gulati, supra note 59, at 993. The argument that unanimous action
clauses are suboptimal is rooted in the inherent hold-up problems generated by
the requirement of unanimity. See id. at 932. These hold-up problems
undermine the ability of issuers and bondholders to restructure the debt of
sovereigns in financial distress. Id. However, there exists an opposing
argument that-for precisely the same reason-unanimous action clauses send
a signal to prospective bondholders that the issuer believes there is a low
probability that the bonds will need to be restructured. INT'L MONETARY FUND,
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES IN SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS-
ENCOURAGING GREATER USE 10 (2002), available at https://www.imf.
org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602a.pdf, archived at http://penna.cc/XJ4E-
4TP3.
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shift toward collective action clauses was slow and uneven.61
Accordingly, while empirical research examining the impact of
network externalities on financial contracting and innovation is still
relatively scarce,62 Choi and Gulati's findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that these externalities can impede the process of innovation
that we would otherwise expect to observe under competitive market
conditions.63
B. Path Dependency
A second, if somewhat related, source of potential market
distortions is path dependency. While the concept of path dependence
has been used in a number of different ways and in a number of
64different contexts, in general terms it can be understood as
encapsulating the idea that prior states of the world shape its current
state, and that the current state of the world will shape future states.
65
Accordingly, in a world with many possible outcomes (or
equilibriums), earlier choices will have a disproportionate impact on
which of these equilibriums is ultimately observed.66 As employed in
this Article, path dependence refers to the possibility that market
structures may exhibit a form of "stickiness," preventing market
participants currently using one market structure from migrating to
alternative structures in response to new information, changing market
dynamics, or technological advancements.67 The primary source of this
stickiness is switching costs.68 Specifically, where the costs of
switching from one market structure to another exceed the expected
61 Choi & Gulati, supra note 59, at 993-96.
62 See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial
Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 121
(2004).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
64 See Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1Q.J. POL. ScI. 87, 91 (2006).
65 See NORTH, supra note 5, at 94; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING
THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 51-52 (2005).
66 Klemperer, supra note 50, at 916.
67 See Jenna Bednar & Scott Page, Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?: The
Emergence of Cultural Behavior Within Multiple Games, 19 RATIONALITY &
Soc'Y 65, 69 (2007).
68 Herd behavior and cognitive biases may also play an important
complementary role. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior
and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 366 (1996).
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benefits associated with the new structure, market participants may
rationally decide not to switch-even if the new structure is, relatively
speaking, more desirable.69 As a result, path dependence can be seen as
promoting "stable but inefficient ... equilibrium[s]," steering markets
off the welfare-maximizing course.
70
C. Power Imbalances
The third source of market distortions is power imbalances
between market participants. Economists tend to think of market power
in terms of the ability of market participants to influence the price at
which goods and services are bought and sold.7 ' They thus draw a
distinction between competitive markets in which all buyers and sellers
are "price takers," and markets in which one or more market
participants-owing to their ability to influence supply, demand, or
both-are "price makers.72 Power, however, can also manifest itself in
far more subtle and sophisticated ways. Using examples from the real
estate, brokerage, mutual fund, and derivatives industries, for example,
Kathryn Judge examines how intermediaries can influence the process
by which market structures and other institutional arrangements evolve
over time.73 Through this influence, market power can be used to shape
market structure in ways that serve these intermediaries' narrow self-
interest.74 Importantly, this influence can also be used to undermine the
69 See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms,
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 378 (1997).
71 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1045-46 (2000).
71 See, e.g., JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE
THE ENEMY 49 (2001).
72 Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's Razor:
A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 730
(2004).
73 See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 16-38), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2430163. For a discussion of these influences in
the context of stock and commodity exchanges, see Craig Pirrong, A Theory of
Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J.L. & ECON. 437, 460-61 (2000);
Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The
Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. &ECON. 141, 156-57 (1995).
71 See Judge, supra note 73 (manuscript at 44).
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emergence and adoption of disruptive technologies that represent a
threat to this power.
5
There are many different sources of market power:
monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, network effects,
technological superiority, or advantages in information or expertise, for
example. Two important sources of market power for the present
purposes are market position and bundling. In terms of market position,
Katharina Pistor draws a useful distinction between market participants
at the core, or "apex," of a market and those at the "periphery.' ,76 In the
present context, market participants at the core can be understood as
those either involved in the creation and governance of a market
structure, or whose participation in the market structure represents a
significant source of liquidity. 77 Bundling, meanwhile, refers to the
circumstance where a market participant possesses market power in
respect of two or more different but ultimately complementary
products.78 As observed by Barry Nalebuff, bundling makes it difficult
for competitors offering only one of these products to successfully enter
the marketplace and attract market share.79 As we shall see, the market
position of some financial intermediaries enables them to bundle their
most important product-liquidity-with other complementary
products such as Libor and ISDA's CDS documentation. This, in turn,
puts these intermediaries in an advantageous position to influence the
evolution of these market structures in ways that enable them to extract
rents from those at the periphery, such as institutional investors,
corporate borrowers, and other counterparties.
80
The common theme connecting each of these market
distortions is that they impede the process of innovation from which the
benefits of private ordering are thought to flow, thus potentially
resulting in the entrenchment of less efficient market structures. While
each of these distortions can individually influence the development of
market structures, we would expect their impact to be strongest when
75 Id. (manuscript at 50).
76 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 316
(2013).77 1d. at 319.
78 David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie?
Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE
J. ON REG. 37, 38 (2005).
79 Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 159
(2004).
80 See infra notes 318-19.
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acting in combination. In the next section, we examine their potential
impact in the context of two important market structures at the heart of
modem financial markets.
III. ISDA, the Big Bang Protocol, and the Limits of Private
Ordering Within OTC Derivatives Markets
There are few case studies that illustrate the importance of
market structure more than the multi-trillion dollar market for OTC
derivatives and, specifically, swaps. This section examines the central
role of financial intermediaries-and specifically global swaps
dealers-in providing liquidity to this market, along with the role of
ISDA in developing standardized legal documentation, promoting
international law reform, and addressing ongoing legal, operational, and
technical challenges. This section then puts a relatively new, largely
unexamined, and yet extremely important component of this market
structure under the microscope: the mechanics, prospective benefits,
and potential vulnerabilities of ISDA's Big Bang Protocol.
A. Swaps Dealers, ISDA, and the Development of
OTC Derivatives Markets.
In its simplest form, a swap is a series of mutual forward
obligations whereby two counterparties agree to periodically exchange
(or "swap") cash flows over a specified period of time.8' Perhaps the
most straightforward example is an interest rate swap pursuant to which
one counterparty-e.g. a borrower with fixed rate obligations-agrees
to make payments at a fixed interest rate to another counterparty who in
turn agrees to pay the borrower a variable (or "floating") rate.82 The
fixed rate borrower receiving the floating rate thus stands to benefit
from any subsequent increase in interest rates, whereas its counterparty
receiving the fixed rate will benefit from any decline.83 The periodic
payments due under a swap are calculated with reference to what is
known as the "notional amount.,84 The resulting obligations are then
81 See Christopher J. Redd, Treatment of Securities and Derivatives




84 While the notional amount provides a conventional measure of the size of
OTC derivatives markets, it does not capture the attendant risks. Karsten von
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netted out against one another so that only one counterparty is required
to make payment in any given period.85 Figure 2 depicts a stylized
86interest rate swap transaction.
Figure 2: A Stylized Interest Rate Swap
Fixed Rate






Creditor Fixed Rate: 6.5%
Floating Rate: Libor +
2.0%
Kleist & Carlos Mallo, OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Ha6f of
2009, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 4 (May 2010), http://www.bis.org/
publ/otc hyl005.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L2TS-G2Z8. A more useful
measure of size is "gross market value," which reflects the current exposures of
counterparties under open contracts assuming that these contracts were all
settled immediately. Id. Where possible, therefore, gross market values are
provided along with notional amounts. See id.
85 Redd, supra note 81, at 36.
86 This depiction of an interest rate swap is stylized in several respects. Perhaps
most importantly, as described below, the counterparties to a typical swap will
not contract directly with one another but, rather, will enter into separate swaps
with a single financial intermediary. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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Historically, swaps and other OTC derivatives have been
executed within relatively opaque, quote-driven markets in which
financial intermediaries-so-called "dealers"-"perform an explicit
market-making role: structuring derivatives instruments and marketing
them to clients, on the basis that they are willing to take either side of
the transaction. ," 7 These dealers then typically look to hedge the
resulting exposures by seeking out and entering into offsetting
transactions with other clients or, in many cases, other dealers.88 In
theory, dealers thus seek to maintain a "matched" or neutral trading
book: making money not by taking a view on the future direction of the
market, but by charging each counterparty a fee-either explicitly, or
embedded in their quoted bid-ask spread-for their willingness to stand
on the opposite side of the trade.89
In order to better understand the economic function and
importance of swaps dealers, it may be useful to take a step back and
examine the origins of swaps markets within the post-World War II
international financial system.90 Established in 1944, the Bretton
Woods system of monetary and exchange rate management
contemplated strict capital controls designed to prevent he flight of
capital from jurisdictions pursuing relatively tight monetary and
macroeconomic policies to jurisdictions pursuing more accommodating
policies.91 In effect, these capital controls restricted the amount of
17 Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern
Financial Markets, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 235, 268 (2012).
" See DEUTCHE BORSE GROUP, THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN
INTRODUCTION 17 (2008), available at http://deutsche-boerse.com/
dbg/dispatch/en/binay/gdb contentpool/imported files/public files/10_down
loads/I l-about us/PublicAffairs/TheGlobalDerivativesMarket0508.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/BHG3-2BNB.
89 See William 0. Fisher, Predicting a Heart Attack: The Fundamental Opacity
of Extreme Liquidity Risk, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 479 (2014).
90 For a more detailed history, see PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD
STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 71-79 (2011).
91 Id. at 71-72. The rationale for this was that, in the absence of such controls,
capital would flow to whatever jurisdictions offered the best investment
prospects as measured by future growth potential and the cost of capital. See id.
at 72. While in a floating exchange rate regime we might expect such
international capital flows to be reflected in prevailing exchange rates, the
Bretton Woods' pegged currency regime prevented currencies from adjusting
to fully reflect these flows. See Richard Myrus, Note, From Bretton Woods to
Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the
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money that could move across international borders.92 So-called
"parallel loans"-the predecessor to modern swaps-arose as a means
of circumventing these controls.
93 Parallel loans worked as follows.
94
Imagine a firm domiciled in Germany required renminbi in order to
finance the expansion of a manufacturing facility owned by its Chinese
subsidiary. Under the Bretton Woods system, the German firm would
be prevented from making this capital injection directly. If it could find
a Chinese firm who needed Deutsche marks, however, it could arrange
for two parallel loans: one from the Chinese firm to the German firm's
Chinese subsidiary (denominated in renminbi), and another from the
German firm to the Chinese firm's German subsidiary (denominated in
Deutsche marks).95 No money would cross international borders, thus
ensuring that the letter of Bretton Woods-although certainly not the
spirit-was strictly observed.
Dealers performed two important economic functions within
the market for parallel loans. First, dealers would use their client
networks in each jurisdiction to assist firms in identifying potential
counterparties.96 Second, in our example, the foreign subsidiaries of
both the German and Chinese firms are extremely vulnerable to
counterparty credit risk.97 Were their counterparties to become
insolvent, for example, or if these counterparties were to
opportunistically seek to prematurely terminate the relevant loan, the
subsidiaries would be left struggling to find a replacement counterparty
before they ran out of Deutsche mark or renminbi liquidity. 98 One way
to address this problem is by interposing a dealer between the two
firms.99 While the dealer would still be exposed to counterparty credit
International Monetary Fund and the European Community, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2095, 2097-99 (1994).
92 See supra note 91.
93 See Graham Rowbotham, Can Banks Secure Their Own Deposits?, 6 INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 18, 19 (1987).
9' For an example of parallel loans similar to the one that follows, see Charles
R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU. L. REV. 505, 528 (1998).
95 In reality, the funds for these loans would typically be borrowed by the
parent firm from a financial institution located in the relevant jurisdiction.
96 See David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the
Trading of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 996 (1991).
97 See MEHRLING, supra note 90, at 73.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 74.
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risk, its balance sheet was also likely to be more diversified.'00 Dealers
were also likely to have access to more sources of liquidity and be
better positioned to hedge any residual exposures.10 1 Simultaneously,
their status as repeat players in the marketplace arguably made dealers
less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. Accordingly, in addition
to their often considerable informational advantages, these dealers were
generally better positioned to manage the exchange rate, counterparty
credit, liquidity, and other risks associated with the use of parallel
loans. 102
The Bretton Woods system was dismantled during the
1970s.10 3 The innovation it spawned, however, would eventually evolve
into modem day currency swaps.104 Like their twentieth century
forbearers, twenty-first century swaps dealers are central to the
operation of modem swaps markets, "representing . . . the primary
source of market access, [trading] information and liquidity.' 105 Indeed,
in this respect, dealers can themselves be understood as important
market structures.106 This importance "is reflected in the concentration
of trading activity within these markets. As of June 2010, for example,
the fourteen largest OTC derivatives dealers (the so-called 'G14')"
were counterparties to swaps representing approximately eighty-two
100 See id.
... See id. at 74-75.
102 See id.
103 The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972-81), INT'L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/extemal/about/histend.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/
ESG8-D4AS.
104 See supra note 90. Once the Bretton Woods capital controls were removed,
parallel loans were no longer required in order to capitalize foreign
subsidiaries. See supra note 103. At the same time, however, the dismantling
of the Bretton Woods pegged exchange rate regime meant that many
currencies now floated against one another on the basis of market forces. Id.
Accordingly, finns needed to manage the foreign exchange risk associated
with their foreign operations. By eliminating the requirement to make the
actual loan-which had always been costly for dealers because they had to
keep it on their books-and focusing instead on exchanging cash flows on the
basis of fluctuations in the two currencies, parallel loans thus evolved into the
first currency swaps. See MEHRLING, supra note 90, at 72-75.
1o' See Awrey, supra note 87, at 268.
106 This fact, as examined in greater detail below, potentially generates
considerable positive network externalities, path dependence, and power
imbalances in the context of market structures such as the Big Bang Protocol.
See infra Part V.
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percent of the global notional amount outstanding.°7 Collectively,
these dealers have thus played a pivotal role in the emergence and
development of OTC derivatives markets.
Dealers have had an important ally in the development of
global swaps markets: the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association. Originally named the International Swaps Dealers
Association, ISDA is the de facto trade association of the global OTC
derivatives industry, representing some 800 member dealers,




Established in 1985, ISDA's core mandate is to encourage the prudent
and efficient development of OTC derivatives markets through the
promotion of, among other things, practices conducive to the efficient
conduct of business, sound risk management practices, and high
standards of commercial conduct.0 9 By at least one measure, ISDA has
been extremely successful in its pursuit of this mandate. As of
December 31, 2013, the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS")
estimated the total outstanding notional amount of all OTC derivatives
to be approximately $710 trillion" 0 -up from $3.45 trillion in 1990."'1
Simultaneously, whereas an authoritative desk reference in 1985 (had
one existed) might have identified a universe of perhaps a dozen or so
relatively basic derivatives, today there are hundreds-if not
thousands-of different species of OTC options, forwards, swaps, and
structured investment products."l
2
ISDA's contribution toward the development of OTC
derivatives markets can be observed across at least three dimensions.
107 Awrey, supra note 87, at 268 (citing David Mengle, Concentration of OTC
Derivatives among Major Dealers, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES, 3 (2010),
http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ConcentrationRN 4-10.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/CL72-8UXY).
108 About ISDA, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, www2.isda.org/about-
ISDA (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BF4E-TV9X.
109 Id.
110 OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2013, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, 2 (May 2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc hyl405.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8XQZ-4VPH.
III International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 35 (August 1996), http://www.bis.org/publ/r qt9608.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/R8GK-CJ45.
11' For a comprehensive-if increasingly dated-taxonomy of OTC
derivatives, see generally RICHARD FLAVELL, SWAPS AND OTHER
DERIVATIVES (2d ed. 2011). See also SATYAJIT DAS, DERIVATIVES PRODUCTS
&PRICING 81-140 (2006).
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First, ISDA has been the driving force behind the development of
standardized legal documentation for use in connection with OTC
derivatives transactions."13 Prior to the intervention of ISDA and
organizations such as the BBA, the majority of OTC derivatives were
documented in ad hoc agreements negotiated on a transaction-by-
transaction basis."14 The absence of standardized legal documentation
understandably represented a significant barrier to the growth of OTC
derivatives markets."15 Stepping into this breach, ISDA published its
Code of Standard Wording, Assumptions, and Provisions for Swaps
(the "ISDA Swaps Code") in 1985.116 The ISDA Swaps Code was, in
effect, "a glossary of [standard] terms that reflected the [then existing]
practices" within the nascent U.S. interest rate swap market."1
7
In the eyes of many, however, ISDA's defining moment would
come in 1987 with the publication of its first standardized "master"
agreements for U.S. dollar and multi-currency interest rate swaps and
currency swaps.'" ISDA master agreements incorporate multiple future
transactions between two counterparties under the umbrella of a single
legal relationship, contemplating only the preparation of a brief trade
confirmation for individual transactions."l 9 Master agreements thus
serve to reduce the drafting, negotiation, and other transaction costs
which would otherwise be incurred in connection with the preparation
of legal documentation for individual trades.120 The standardization of
legal terms and terminology also results in greater commoditization,
thereby lowering the information and hedging costs associated with
these contracts.121
Over time, the scope of ISDA master agreements has been
expanded to include a broad range of transactions, including OTC
equity, commodity, and credit derivatives.122 ISDA has developed
standardized ancillary documentation-e.g. definitions, schedules,
credit support agreements, and trade confirmations-for use in
113 See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
114 Noman Meacham Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 736 (2002).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 737.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 738-39.
120 See id.
121 See Thomas R. McLean, Telemedicine and the Commoditization of Medical
Services, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 131, 132 (2007).
122 See Feder, supra note 114, at 737-39.
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connection with these agreements.123 It has also developed a series of
protocols which facilitate the ex post amendment of existing master
agreements with a view to, among other things, responding to
jurisprudential developments, implementing new advancements,
rectifying perceived technical deficiencies and, ultimately,
standardizing market practice.124 All ISDA master agreements,
ancillary documentation, and protocols are reviewed periodically and
amended as necessary by ISDA technical committees.125 These
technical committees are staffed by representatives drawn from ISDA's
membership with assistance from external legal and other advisors.
126
Reflecting this wealth of expertise, ISDA documentation is widely
regarded as the gold standard within OTC derivatives markets-and in
particular global swaps markets. 1
27
Second, ISDA has taken the lead in promoting international
law reform in areas vital to the development of OTC derivatives
markets. Perhaps most significantly, ISDA has produced a Model
Netting Act and supplemental guidance for legislators with a view to
assisting them in enacting legislation designed to ensure the
enforceability of close-out netting and related financial collateral
arrangements upon the occurrence of a termination event or event of
default-e.g. the commencement of insolvency proceedings involving
a swap counterparty-as defined under ISDA's contractual
documentation.128 In effect, the Model Netting Act is designed to
123 See id. at 739.
124 See About ISDA Protocols, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-
protocols/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/74K6-
EFRU.
125 See Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational
Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the
Future of Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 21 (2013).
126 For a list of these committees, see Committees, INT'L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS'N, http://www2.isda.org/committees/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5ZRD-QRSB.
121 See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 125, at 21 ("[T]he ISDA Master
Agreement is used in more than ninety percent of OTC derivative
transactions.").
128 See Opinions, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, www2.isda.org/
functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions (last visited Nov. 17,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P265-TMVW (providing links to the "2006
ISDA Model Netting Act-Version 2" and the "Memorandum on the
Implementation of the Model Netting Act").
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ensure that OTC derivatives enjoy a carve-out from any automatic stay
or fraudulent preference provisions imposed under applicable
insolvency laws.129 As of November 17, 2014, netting legislation based
on this guidance has been adopted in at least forty jurisdictions
including the U.S., U.K., E.U., Japan, and Canada.130 More broadly,
ISDA has played an active role in influencing public policy and
financial law reform-including the design and implementation of
post-crisis reforms targeting OTC derivatives markets such as Title VII
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank Act") and the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation ("EMIR"). 131 Whether or not one views the Model Netting
Act and other reforms as desirable from a broader societal perspective,
there is little doubt that they have helped pave the way for the
spectacular growth of OTC derivatives markets in recent decades. 1
32
Finally, ISDA has helped coordinate ad hoc responses to
industry-wide legal, operational, and technical challenges. From 2005
to 2006, for example, ISDA joined with the Federal Reserve Bank of
121 See Memorandum on the Implementation of Netting Legislation, Int'l
Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n 5 (2006), available at http://Www2.isda.org/
functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions, archived at http://penna.
cc/P265-TMVW. ISDA has also commissioned legal opinions in many
jurisdictions to provide market participants with enhanced transactional
certainty. See Opinions, supra note 128.
130 Netting Legislation-Status, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat of net leg.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/3JRJ-T6FG.
131 See ISDA Focus: Dodd-Frank, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
http://www2.isda.org/dodd-frank (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7P5L-ADV9; ISDA Focus: European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR), INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, http://www2.
isda.org/emir (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://penna.cc/6W4S-
Y687. For a more complete account of the ISDA's public policy initiatives
around the world, see Public Policy, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
www2.isda.org/functional-areas/public-policy (last visited Nov. 17, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/9344-KSJU.
132 For a discussion of the potential moral hazard and other problems stemming
from the carve-outs for OTC derivatives under U.S. bankruptcy law, see
Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 119 n.4 (2005);
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1048-50 (2007); Mark J. Roe, The
Derivative Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63
STAN. L. REv. 539, 555-68 (2011).
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New York to help resolve a massive backlog of unconfirmed trades.'33
ISDA has also been one of the catalysts behind the development and
adoption of Financial Products Mark-up Language ("FpML") as the
standard for electronic dealing and processing of OTC derivatives
transactions.134 More recently, ISDA has also worked to create a
detailed taxonomy of OTC derivatives as the first step toward the
development of unique product identifiers ("UPIs").135 Together with
Legal Entity Identifiers ("LEIs"), UPIs will eventually enable market
participants and regulatory authorities to construct more accurate and
complete maps of the complex interconnections within and between
financial markets and institutions and, thus, better understand the
location, nature, and extent of the potential risks lurking within the
global financial system. 136
ISDA has thus played an important role in the development of
the market structures-master agreements, netting legislation, and
FpML-which collectively form the institutional backbone of OTC
derivatives markets. Crucially, the benefits of these market structures
can be understood as flowing largely from the same source:
standardization. Master agreements standardize legal terms and
terminology,137 protocols ensure consistency between historical and
future contracts,138 netting legislation ensures equivalent treatment of
closeout netting and financial collateral arrangements across
jurisdictions,139 and FpML ensures uniform back office processes.
140
... See Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Industry Groups Urge
Continued Focus on Credit Derivative Efforts; Confirmation Backlog
Reduction Exceeds Target (July 19, 2006), available at
http://www.isda.org/press/press071906.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/VW3H-28P9; Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n,
ISDA Launches Protocol to Ease Transfer of Derivatives Trades; Advances
Association's Effort to Increase Operational Efficiency (Sept. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.isda.org/press/press091305.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/TL43-VRQ2.
134 See Andrew Party, ISDA/FpML for Financial Derivatives, 22 J. INT'L
BANKING L. & REG. 495, 496 (2007).
135 See ISDA Focus: Identifiers and OTC Taxonomies, INT'L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS'N, http://www2.isda.org/identifiers-and-otc-taxonomies/
page/2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/R9WS-9ZUQ.
136 For an overview of the fledgling LEI/UPI project, see Armour et al. supra
note 47.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
138 See supra text accompanying note 124.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
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This standardization makes swaps and other OTC derivatives easier to
write and understand. The standardization of non-economic terms also
makes it easier for counterparties-and dealers in particular-to
effectively hedge their exposures.141
Figure 3
(Cmtr )k. (CmtyI)k. (CoE ry C
Standardized legal terms (k.)
Inter temporal standardization via
protocols
Standardized netting legislation
(in each of A, B and C)
Standardized back office processing
(FpML)
In order to understand why contractual, legislative, and other
forms of standardization are so important to dealers, imagine a dealer
standing between two clients on opposite sides of a trade as in Figure 3.
Imagine also that the dealer and each of the counterparties were
domiciled in and subject to the laws of different jurisdictions. The
dealer, as we have already seen, would theoretically prefer to maintain
a matched book and simply collect its fee for bringing the
counterparties together and assuming the resulting counterparty credit
and other risks (which, of course, it may also offload via subsequent
trades).142 What would happen, however, if the courts in one
jurisdiction (Country A) issued an interpretation of a term of ISDA's
master agreement which was materially inconsistent with the
interpretation in another jurisdiction (Country C)? Alternatively, what if
applicable insolvency laws in Country A contained carve-outs from any
automatic stay and fraudulent preference provisions, thereby enabling
counterparties to closeout their positions and seize collateral upon
another counterparty's bankruptcy-but Country C's insolvency
legislation did not?
Dealers can largely resolve the first problem by ensuring that
the contracts are both governed by the laws of a single jurisdiction: in
140 See supra text accompanying note 134.
141 See supra text accompanying note 101.
142 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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practice, typically the United States or United Kingdom.143 The second
problem, however, is far more difficult to resolve. At the very least, this
differential treatment would make it more complex-and thus more
costly-for the dealer to effectively hedge its exposures under the two
swaps. In extremis, the resulting risks might even undermine the
incentives of the dealer to enter into swaps and other OTC derivatives
with counterparties subject to the insolvency laws of other jurisdictions,
thereby undermining the global nature of these markets. From the
dealer's perspective, therefore, standardization is not only a means of
reducing drafting, negotiating, back office processing, and other
transaction costs, but an important means of minimizing the legal and
economic differences between the two sides of a trade, commonly
referred to as "basis risk.', 144 From the perspective of other market
participants, meanwhile, this standardization-along with the benefits it
generates for dealers-contributes to greater market liquidity. 1
45
Both swaps dealers and ISDA's standardized contractual
documentation can thus be understood as highly successful market
structures. As we shall see, however, the benefits generated by these
market structures are also the source of significant positive network
externalities, path dependency, and power imbalances.146 Before
examining the potential impact of these market distortions, however,
we first turn our attention to one of the most significant changes to
143 As of April 2010, it is estimated that these two jurisdictions accounted for
approximately seventy percent of the global turnover in OTC interest rate
derivatives, and fifty-five percent of the global turnover in foreign exchange
derivatives. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK
SURVEY: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN APRIL
2010 5-6 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxlO.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/KDL7-M5NW. Unfortunately, the triennial survey in 2013 did
not provide an update of these estimates. See Triennial Central Bank Survey of
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2013, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxl3.htm (last updated Dec. 8,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3 CEW-JC7V.
144 See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged)
Risks of Hedging with Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813,
871-73 (2014).
115 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. These non-dealer counterparties
may also benefit from a reduction in legal and other fonns of basis risk insofar
as they, too, are entering into multiple (potentially offsetting) swaps with
multiple counterparties.
146 See infra Part V.
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ISDA's standard documentation in recent years: the introduction of the
Big Bang Protocol.
B. Derivatives Market Structure Under the
Microscope: ISDA's Big Bang Protocol
There is a good chance that you have never heard of the Big
Bang Protocol. If you were following events in the Eurozone in the
early months of 2012, however, you would have undoubtedly observed
that all of Europe-and seemingly the entire financial world-was
gripped by a single question: had Greece defaulted? More precisely,
the question was whether Greece's unilateral move to insert collective
action clauses into its domestically denominated debt-essentially to
facilitate a massive restructuring-constituted an event of default,
which would be the first sovereign default by a Eurozone country since
the introduction of the Euro in 1999.147 The answer to this question
would not come from a court, or parliament, or even the so-called
"Troika," comprised of the International Monetary Fund, European
Commission, and European Central Bank and charged with
responsibility for sorting out Greece's crumbling finances. Rather, the
answer would come from a committee comprised of fifteen private
individuals representing some of the world's largest and most powerful
financial institutions.148 It is the Big Bang Protocol that bestows this
committee with such an important responsibility. 1
49
To understand the origin and significance of the Big Bang
Protocol one must first understand the basic mechanics of credit default
swaps. A credit default swap ("CDS") is a derivative contract whereby
one counterparty-often referred to as the "credit protection seller"-
147 The answer, ultimately, was that the exercise of the collective action clauses
by Greece to amend the terms of its domestically denominated debt did
constitute an event of default. See Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives
Ass'n, ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee: Restructuring Credit Event





"9 See Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, ISDA Announces
Successful Implementation of 'Big Bang' CDS Protocol; Determinations
Committees and Auction Settlement Changes Take Effect (Apr. 8, 2009),
available at http://www.isda.org/press/press040809.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/EQL8-95EQ.
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agrees to compensate another counterparty-the "credit protection
buyer"-upon the occurrence of certain prescribed events of default (or
"credit events") in connection with the debt obligations of one or more
underlying "reference" entities. 150 The economic effect of a CDS is thus
to transfer some or all of the credit risk associated with the underlying
debt (or "reference") obligations from the credit protection buyer, who
may or may not be holding this instrument, to the credit protection
seller.151 Triggering credit events typically include: a reference entity's
insolvency or failure to pay its debts when due ("bankruptcy"), a
sovereign issuer's failure to pay its debts when due ("failure to pay" 152),
and any number of circumstances in which creditors agree to amend the
terms of the relevant reference obligations in order to avoid bankruptcy
or failure to pay ("restructuring").153 Reference entities can include
corporate and sovereign debt issuers, baskets of debt instruments, or
financial indices.154 Reference obligations, meanwhile, can include
bonds, loans, or virtually any other form of debt instrument. 155 As of
December 31, 2013, the BIS estimated the total outstanding notional
amount of single-name, multiple-name, and index CDS to be
approximately $21 trillion. 156 Like other swap markets, the vast
151 See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and Its Limits: The
Evolution of the Credit Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 689,
690 (2009-2010). The credit protection seller provides this protection in
exchange for a periodic fee-putting them in a similar position to the fixed rate
borrower under the stylized swap depicted in Figure 2. Id.
151 See id.
152 A distinct "failure to pay" credit event is necessaly in connection with
sovereign CDS because there is no mechanism whereby sovereign states can
declare (or be put into) bankruptcy. See CDS on US Sovereign Debt-FAQ,
INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, 1, http://www2.isda.org/
attachment'NTk3Ng==/CDS/o2Oon020U S%20 Sovereign o2ODebt o2OFAQ
%202013-10-09.pdf (last updated Oct. 9, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZB3M-TKH5.
153 See Shadab, supra note 150, at 690; CDS on US Sovereign Debt-FAQ,
supra note 152, at 1.
154 See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit
Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 176 (2007).
155 See Shadab, supra note 150, at 690.
156 OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2013, supra note 110, at 5.
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majority of CDS contracts are entered into using ISDA's credit
derivatives documentation.1
57
Most early CDS contracts contemplated "physical" settlement
upon the occurrence of a credit event.158 Physical settlement requires
credit protection buyers to deliver the underlying reference
obligations-e.g. the actual bonds-to the credit protection seller as a
condition of payment.159 Following the rapid expansion of CDS
markets between 2000 and 2008,160 however, the aggregate notional
amount outstanding of CDS contracts written on many reference
obligations came to exceed the aggregate face value of the reference
obligations themselves.161 Just prior to its 2005 bankruptcy, for
example, CDS contracts written on the debt of Delphi Automotive PLC
exceeded the par value of the underlying debt by nearly 13:1.162 This
disconnect between the CDS market and the supply of available
163reference obligations impeded the physical settlement process.
Perhaps most importantly, it introduced the possibility of a bond
c.squeeze": a "mad scramble" among credit protection buyers to acquire
157 See Dan Wielsch, Global Law's Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards,
60 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1075, 1085 (2012).
158 See Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association? Regulating Credit Default
Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 407, 432 (2010).159 
Id.
160 While reliable evidence from the early part of the decade is scarce, the BIS
estimates that between December 2004 and June 2008 the notional amount
outstanding grew from approximately $6 trillion to $58 trillion. See Fabio
Fornari et al., OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Half of 2004,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 3 (May 2005), http://www.bis.org/
pub1Iotc hy0505.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SFZ5-G78D (reporting
notional amount outstanding of CDSs to be $6.4 trillion); Jacob Gyntelberg &
Carlos Mallo, OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Half of 2008,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 10 (May 2009), http://www.bis.org/
pub1Iotc hy0905.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S577-VXXJ (reporting
notional amount outstanding of CDSs in June 2008 to be $57.325 trillion).
161 Mikhail Chemov et al., CDS Auctions 2 (July 20, 2012) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://faculty.london.edu/imakarov/
index files/CDSauctions.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4TA6-LY98.
161 See Lily Tijoe, Note, Credit Derivatives: Regulatory Challenges in an
Exploding Industry, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 387, 400 (2007).
163 JEAN HELWEGE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No.
372, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AUCTIONS 2 (2009), available at
http ://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr372.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/BC9C-QEQY.
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the reference obligations upon the occurrence of a credit event.16 4 This
squeeze, in turn, could artificially inflate the price of the reference
obligations-driving a wedge between market and recovery value. 1
65
As an alternative to physical settlement, CDS contracts may
also be subject to "cash" settlement.'66 Cash settlement relieves credit
protection buyers from the requirement to deliver the underlying
reference obligations.167 Instead, credit protection buyers receive cash
from sellers equal to the notional amount of the CDS multiplied by the
loss in value experienced by the reference obligations.168 On a CDS
with a notional amount of $10 million where the reference obligation
was trading at 70 cents on the dollar, for example, the credit protection
buyer would receive $3 million (10 million x [1.00-0.70]). 169 Cash
settlement thus resolves the bond squeeze problem.170 Simultaneously,
though, it requires counterparties to fix a current price for the relevant
reference obligations.171 This, however, can be highly problematic in
the context of relatively opaque and illiquid markets for bonds, loans,
and other reference obligations72 -a problem often exacerbated by the
sort of market dislocation often observed in connection with a credit
event. 1
73
To resolve the problems associated with physical and cash
settlement, ISDA developed a number of ad hoc auction settlement
protocols to deal with specific credit events. The first such protocol for
single-name CDS contracts was employed in connection with the 2006
bankruptcy of Dura Operating Corp. 17 4 The auctions held pursuant o
these protocols established a single market price for the relevant
reference obligations, thereby facilitating the smooth operation of the
161 Id. at 2, 4. Trading volumes in the debt of Delphi, for example, were several
times higher than their historical averages in the first weeks following its
bankmptcy. See id. at 19.
165 See id. at 2.166 Id. at4.
167 See id. at 4-5.
168 See Shadab, supra note 158, at 432.
169 For a similar example, see HELWEGE ET AL., supra note 163, at 5.170 Id. at6.
171 Id. at 5.
172 HELWEGE ET AL., supra note 163, at 5; Armour et al., supra note 47;
Chemov et al., supra note 161, at 2.
173 HELWEGE ET AL., supra note 163, at 5; Chemov et al., supra note 161, at 1.
174 See generally 2006 Dura CDS Protocol, INT'L SwAPs & DERIVATIVES
ASS'N (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.isda.org/2006duracdsprot/docs/
2006duraProtocol.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3DL-RWUX.
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cash settlement mechanism, reducing the need for physical settlement,
and eliminating recovery basis risk.'75 Theoretically, auctions can also
help tether the market price of the underlying debt to its recovery
value.176 Ultimately, however, these auction protocols only applied to a
narrow range of reference entities and obligations and, even then, only
where counterparties had mutually agreed to adhere to them.
177
Moreover, physical, cash, and auction settlement all required
counterparties to agree that a credit event had, in fact, occurred.
Predictably, this issue was often the subject of intense debate78
leading to costly and duplicative third party dispute resolution. 179
On April 8, 2009, ISDA announced the implementation of the
2009 Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees and Auction
Settlement CDS (or "Big Bang") Protocol.' ° The implementation of
17' For a more detailed description-and critique-of this auction mechanism,
see generally HELWEGE ET AL., supra note 163; Chemov et al., supra note 161.
176 Whether this is in fact the case is ultimately an empirical question. See, e.g.,
Chemov et al., supra note 161, at 24 (finding that auctions undervalue bonds
by an average of six percent).
177 See HELWEGE ET AL., supra note 163, at 5-6.
178 See, e.g., Katia Porzecanski, BofA Says Argentine Default Definition
Unclear for Bonds to CDS, BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2014, 2:09 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/bofa-says-argentine-default-
definition-unclear-for-bonds-to-cds.html, archived at http://penua.cc/FS5G-
RK86.
179 Prior to the introduction of the Big Bang Protocol, ISDA documentation
provided for this dispute resolution mechanism in the form of so-called
"calculation agents." By convention, the calculation agent was typically the
dealer that intermediated the transaction, If a counterparty disagreed with the
determination of the calculation agent, it could refer the matter to an
independent third party. These third parties were themselves typically other
dealers.
180 See Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 149. ISDA
also introduced the 2009 ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees
and Auction Settlement Supplement to the 2003 Credit Derivatives
Definitions. ISDA Publishes Supplement to the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions and "Big Bang" Protocol, ALLEN & OVERY (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://www.allenoveiy.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/ISDA-Auction-
Hardwiring.aspx [hereinafter ISDA Supplement and Protocol], archived at
http://perma.cc/Z7TA-ZMU4. The Credit Derivatives Definitions themselves
were updated in 2014. 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, INT'L SWAPS
& DERIVATIVES ASS'N, http://www2.isda.org/asset-classes/credit-
derivatives/2014-isda-credit-derivatives-definitions/, archived at http://perma.
cc/Q8WP-PXG4. For ease of exposition this Article refers to both the protocol
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the Big Bang Protocol was significant in two respects. First, it
hardwired the auction settlement mechanism, incorporating it into
standard CDS documentation across all reference entities and
obligations.'"' Second, and more importantly for the present purposes,
it established a new mechanism designed to facilitate the adjudication
of certain technical issues arising in connection with ISDA's credit
derivatives documentation.18 2 This mechanism enables counterparties
to CDS contracts and other eligible transactions to request that a
determinations committee ("DC") be constituted for the purpose of
adjudicating a range of potential issues.83 These issues include, among
other things, whether a credit event has occurred, whether to hold an
auction to determine a settlement price following the occurrence of a
credit event, and the identity of the reference obligations to be valued in
connection with any such auction.18 4  Importantly, a DC's
determinations are binding in respect to all transactions of the relevant
type that incorporate the Big Bang Protocol. 1
8 5
The Big Bang Protocol establishes five regional DCs.'8 6 Each
DC is comprised of 15 voting members: one designate each from eight
global derivatives dealers, two regional dealers, and five non-dealer (or
and supplement as the "Big Bang" Protocol. Technically, however, the
supplement applied prospectively to future transactions while the protocol
applied to then outstanding transactions. See ISDA Supplement and Protocol,
supra. The Big Bang Protocol was followed in July 2009 by the "Small Bang"
Protocol, which extended the application of the former to certain restructuring
credit events. See Small Bang Protocol, INT'L SwAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
http://www.isda.org/smallbang (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at
http://perima.cc/FN7D-7J9V.
181 Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 149.
182 In addition to CDS contracts, this mechanism applies to certain credit-
linked notes and synthetic collateralized debt obligations. See ISDA
Supplement and Protocol, supra note 180.
183 See 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees Rules, INT'L
SwAPs & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, § 2.1(a) (Sept. 16, 2014), http://dc.isda.org/wp-
content/files mf/14144370041CM2319997111v10DC Rules 2014.pdf
[hereinafter DC Rules], archived at http://perma.cc/8CTP-4MLQ.
184 Id. § 3. See also ISDA Supplement and Protocol, supra note 180.
185 See ISDA Supplement and Protocol, supra note 180. This is the case except
where the counterparties "bilaterally agree . . . to disapply the relevant
Determinations Committee's decision." Id.
186 The five "regions" are (1) the Americas; (2) Europe, the Middle East and
Africa; (3) Japan; (4) Australia and New Zealand, and (5) Asia (excluding
Japan). DC Rules, supra note 183, § 6.
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"buy-side") market participants. 18 7 Dealer members are selected on the
basis of their trading volumes in OTC credit derivatives.188 Buy-side
members, meanwhile, are selected from a pool of financial institutions
meeting prescribed asset and derivatives thresholds.89 ISDA itself "acts
as a non-voting secretary to each DC, and endeavors to co-ordinate [the
adjudication] process in a transparent and operationally efficient
manner."'190 Each DC must reach a supermajority, defined to be "at
least 80% of those participating in a binding vote," in connection with
the most important determinations.191 This includes whether a credit
event has occurred,192 whether to allow the substitution of a reference
obligation,193 and whether a succession event has occurred, along with
the identity of any successor entity. 194 Other DC determinations are
made by simple majority.
195
Where the requisite supermajority voting threshold is not
reached, the DC Rules contemplate that the issue will be referred to a
panel of three external reviewers selected from a pool of independent
experts nominated by ISDA members and approved by a majority of
the members of the relevant DC. 196 Notably, unlike the DC mechanism
itself, the external review process includes a procedure for both the
recusal and removal of potential external reviewers on the basis of
187 Id. § 6. These rles also contemplate the involvement of non-voting
consultative dealer and non-dealer members. Id.
Id. § 1.3(a).
Id. at sched. 2. Criteria for buy-side membership include $1 billion in assets
under management and single-name CDS contracts with a notional amount of
$1 billion. Id. If a non-dealer meets these criteria it "shall be deemed to be
approved" absent a vote from two-thirds of the buy-side committee members
denying such approval. Id.
190 Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee, INT'L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS'N, http://dc.isda.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/5LBN-YLHU.
191 DC Rules, supra note 183, § 6; see also ISDA Supplement and Protocol,
supra note 180.
192 DC Rules, supra note 183, § 3.1(c).
193 Id. § 3.6(a).
194 Id. § 3.5.
195 Determinations regarding whether to hold an auction, for example, are
decided by simple majority. Id. § 3.2.
19' Id. § 4.1(a). In effect, the external review mechanism is only available in
respect of issues requiring an eighty percent supermajority. The only exception
to this is a catchall category, "Other Determinations Relating to the Overall
Market," which, although only requiring a majority, can still be referred for
external review. Id.
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actual or potential conflicts of interest.'97 Once the panel is selected, the
external reviewers review both written and oral arguments in favor of
each presented position. 198 Each external reviewer must then select one
of these positions.199 Where a position originally received more than
sixty percent but less than eighty percent support from the DC, the
DC's decision will prevail "unless the [e]xtemal [r]eviewers
unanimously conclude that another [p]resented [p]osition is 'the better
answer.' 200 Where a position received less than or equal to sixty
percent support, this threshold is reduced to two-thirds of the external
reviewers.20 1 Decisions of the external reviewers are deemed to have
been ratified by the DC from which the issue was originally referred.20 2
When considering an issue, DC members must "perform [their]
obligations.., in a commercially reasonable manner" and "base [their]
vote[s] on information that is either public or can be published" on
ISDA's website.203 Simultaneously, however, the DC rules include a
disclaimer of liability for both DC members and ISDA (in its capacity
as DC secretary) stipulating that they shall not "undertake any duty of
care or otherwise be liable to any party... for any form of damages...
that might arise in connection with . . . performance of [its] duties,"
other than those arising from "gross negligence, fraud or wilful
misconduct. ,
204
Ultimately, the Big Bang Protocol can be seen as holding out a
number of potentially significant benefits for market participants. First,
as described above, auction settlement reduces both the operational
complexity and basis risk associated with CDS markets.205 By
hardwiring this mechanism into standard CDS documentation-thus
ensuring its widespread use-the Big Bang Protocol maximizes the
extent of these benefits. Second, the DC mechanism provides an expert
and a more or less real time dispute resolution mechanism for important
contractual issues. The DC Rules contemplate the determination of
197 Id. § § 4.2(a), 4.3.
198Id. § 4.5.
199 Id. § 4.6(d).
200 Id. § 4.6(d)(i).
211 Id. § 4.6(d)(ii).
212 Id. § 4.6(g).
203 Id. § 2.5(b).
204 Id. § 5.1(b).
205 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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most issues within a matter of days20 6 (although a significant number of
determinations-those involving General Motors, Fortis, Bradford &
Bingley, Northwest Airlines and Mitsubishi UFJ, for example-have
taken several weeks or even months to resolve).2 °7 The DC mechanism
also reduces the costs associated with protracted and duplicative third
party dispute resolution and, importantly, eliminates the rather
unsettling prospect that two adjudicators2 °8 might independently arrive
at different conclusions regarding, for example, whether a credit event
had occurred. In these and other important respects, the benefits of both
auction hardwiring and the DC mechanism can, once again, be
understood as flowing largely from increased standardization as
depicted in Figure 4. This standardization, in turn, makes CDS
contracts more fungible and liquid-thereby facilitating the shift
toward centralized clearing contemplated under both the Dodd-Frank
Act and EMIR.20 9 The commoditization of many standardized CDS
contracts implicit in this shift might also be expected to yield further
savings for some market participants.
210
206 As of March 7, 2012, ISDA estimated that in connection with "the last ten
[c]redit [e]vents, the average DC deliberation time . . . was one day in the
Americas and three days in Europe." The ISDA Credit Derivatives
Determination Committees, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, 3 (May
2012), https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDMNA==/AGM% 202012_
DC%20anniversary appendix 043012.pdf [hereinafter Determination
Committees], archived at http://perma.cc/49YQ-DSB4.
207 As of November 17, 2014, the longest period elapsed between a submitted
request and a determination-almost 20 months-involved the question of
whether Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. had experienced a succession credit
event. See The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V., INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
ASS'N, http://dc.isda.org/cds/the-royal-bank-of-scotland-n-v/ (last visited Nov.
17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7NGV-HL3Q.
208 The adjudicators could be courts, calculation agents, or other independent
third parties.
2o9 Anupam Chandler & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A
Case Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 639, 645 n.20
(2010). For this reason, regulators have been supportive of the Big Bang
Protocol. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed
Welcomes CDS Auction Hardwiring (Mar. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/ma090312.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/6WB7-L7CT.
210 See supra text accompanying note 121.
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Figure 4
k. [k.





interpretation of triggering events and
other procedural matters
(DCs)
At the same time, however, the design of the DC mechanism
manifests an obvious and potentially fatal structural flaw. Specifically,
it fails to acknowledge or adequately constrain the acute conflicts of
interest generated by the fact that DC members are permitted to wear
two hats: one as a major contractual counterparty, the other as an
adjudicator of issues which determine the payoffs under the very same
contracts.211 At the core of this conflict is the reality that, contrary to the
theoretical market-making model pursuant to which dealers seek to
maintain a matched book, they may in fact take a directional position in
one or more reference obligations or entities (or correlated assets).212
This raises the prospect that-rather than making determinations as a
neutral and independent referee-DC members will vote in their self-
interest on the basis of their current exposures.213 Put simply, dealers
might "vote their book.,214 It also opens the door to collusion amongst
DC members looking to secure an outcome in connection with one
determination in exchange for future reciprocity.
It is highly informative in this regard that DC Rules do not
require DC members to establish internal governance arrangements-
e.g. ethical firewalls, recusal or removal mechanisms, etc.-that might
211 Yves Quintin, Alis ... da in Wonderland or Greek Tragedy? The Dynamics
of Credit Default Swaps and the "Voluntary" Greek Debt Restructuring of
2011/2012, 2012 INT'L Bus. L.J. 277, 281 (2012) ("A determination that a
Credit Event has occurred is therefore veiy much controlled by the 'sell side'
of the DC, whose interests are likely to be most affected if a Credit Event
occurs: the sell side always has a majority of votes (10 out of 15) and may
(assuming the ability to muster 10 votes) only be overturned by a unanimous
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ameliorate these conflicts of interest.215 Nor does ISDA actively
monitor compliance with DC Rules. Even if ISDA did monitor
compliance, it is highly debatable whether this would translate into a
credible threat of private enforcement.216 Indeed, as a trade association
whose reputation and financial resources are derived from the
involvement of influential market participants-i.e. dealers-ISDA can
be seen as possessing a powerful incentive not to engage in vigorous
enforcement.217 Simultaneously, despite ISDA's assertions to the
contrary,218 the complexity of both CDS markets and dealer balance
sheets219 dilute the threat of any market-based reputational sanctions.
220
They also present a significant obstacle to effective supervision and
enforcement by public regulatory authorities.221 Taken together, these
factors support he claim that the risk-adjusted costs of exploiting the
conflicts of interest embedded within the DC mechanism are relatively
low and, accordingly, are unlikely to represent a meaningful constraint
on opportunistic behavior.22 The result is a market structure, which, in
theory at least, allows DC members to extract private benefits at the
expense of other market participants.
223
A reasonable observer might raise two objections at this point.
First, is this all not just groundless speculation lacking any verifiable
empirical support? This, of course, is a difficult charge to answer-
especially since the information needed to test this claim is not likely to
215 See supra text accompanying note 197. However, as noted below, ISDA's
General Counsel David Geen has suggested that ISDA is working on a "best
practice" policy. See infra note 328 and accompanying text.
216 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 132, at 1037-39.
217 Id.
218 Determination Committees, supra note 206, at 3-4.
219 For a discussion of the complexity of bank balance sheets, see HAMID
MEHRAN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 502,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS? 3-5 (2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff reports/sr502.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9QNA-96UQ;
Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International
Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and
Soundness, in THE OXFoRD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 195,201 (Allen Berger et
al. eds., 2010).
221 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 132, at 1037-39.
221 See HAMID MEHRAN ET AL., supra note 219, at 3-5.
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be found in the public domain. To shed further light on this question,
therefore, it is necessary to draw parallels between the DC mechanism
and another case study where recent developments involving essentially
the same protagonists, exploiting very similar conflicts of interest, have
exposed the nature of the problem. This case study-the manipulation
of Libor-is examined in the next section. The second objection that
might be raised is, if this market structure is so undesirable, why does it
survive in the marketplace? Why do we not observe other, more
desirable, market structures emerging to take its place? The answer to
this question resides in the positive network externalities and path
dependency generated by this market structure, along with the power of
OTC derivatives dealers as important sources of liquidity, to effectively
dictate market practice. As we shall see, it is here that we find another
important set of parallels between the DC mechanism and Libor.224
IV. The BBA, Libor, and the Manipulation of Modern Financial
Markets




Created in 1986, the London Interbank Offered Rate-or Libor-is a
series of indicative interest rates which notionally reflect the rates at
which a selection of panel banks are able to raise funds from other
banks in the London money market.226 Libor is calculated daily across
10 different currencies (including the U.S. dollar, pound sterling, and
euro) and 15 different maturities (ranging from overnight to 12
months).227 Accordingly, while it is not uncommon for Libor to be
quoted as a single figure-typically 3-month U.S. dollar Libor-there
are in fact 150 different Libor rates.
228
Libor was developed by the British Bankers' Association, a
trade association representing approximately 240 member banks.229
224 See infra Part V.
225 See The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST, July 7,
2012, at 25, 25 [hereinafter Rotten Heart].
226 Michael J. De La Merced, Q. & A.: Understanding Libor, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012, 10:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/




229 See About Us, BRIT. BANKERS' ASS'N, http://www.bba.org.uk/about-us (last
visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/B9PY-VN5T.
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Historically, management of the process by which Libor was set was
the responsibility of BBA LIBOR Ltd., a subsidiary of the BBA1
3
1
Every business day, at approximately 11:00 a.m. London time, a panel
of between eight and eighteen banks (depending on the currency231)
were asked the following question: "At what rate could you borrow
funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank
offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 1 lam?,,232 Panel banks
were then required to submit their responses to Thomson Reuters,
which collected submissions on behalf of the BBA.233 These responses
were required to be based on each bank's cost of borrowing unsecured
cash and made without reference to the submissions of other panel
banks.34 Once Thomson Reuters had received the submissions of all
panel banks, it would discard the highest and lowest twenty-five
percent of the panel and use the arithmetic mean of the remaining rates
to calculate the official Libor rate for each currency and maturity.
235
The official rates, along with the submissions of individual panel
members, were then publicly disseminated by Thomson Reuters at
around 11:45am London time.
236
230 See ICE Benchmark Administration: Overview, INTERCONTINENTAL
EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.com/iba (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/X8CM-BKD9.
231 The selection of panel banks was made by the BBA with the assistance of
the Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee, which is itself made up
predominantly of major banks. Panel banks were selected on the basis of
market volume, reputation, and expertise in trading the relevant currency. See
The Basics, BRIT. BANKERS' ASS'N TRENT LTD., http://www.bbalibor.com/
explained/the-basics (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/YK22-3GUH.
232 HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 61
(2012) (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment datalfile/191762/wheatleyreview libor finalreport 2809
12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T92C-JUE9 [hereinafter WHEATLEY FINAL
REPORT]. The Wheatley Review recommended changing this question to: "At
what rate do you think inter-bank term deposits will be offered by one prime
bank to another prime bank for a reasonable market size today at 1 lam?" Id.
(emphasis added).
233 See The Basics, supra note 231.
234 Id.
231 Id. In the case of U.S. dollar Libor-where the panel includes 18 banks-
the top and bottom four submissions were discarded. I
236 Jonathan Macey, Libor: Three Scandals in One: There Is a Way to Reduce
Rate Fixing, FOREIGN AFF. (July 20, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/i 37789/jonathan-macey/libor-three-scandals-in-one.
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The principal benefit of Libor stems from its use as a
benchmark rate of interest in connection with a wide range of financial
contracts.23 7 The floating rate leg of the stylized interest rate swap
depicted in Figure 2, for example, was calculated on the basis of a
spread over Libor (i.e. Libor + 2.0%) .238 The use of Libor as a
benchmark thus saves counterparties the time and expense of having to
formulate and agree upon a methodology for calculating a more
bespoke floating rate.239 The resulting standardization also reduces the
costs of managing the attendant interest rate and basis risks.24 °
Accordingly, as the payouts under more and more contracts have
become linked to Libor, it has become increasingly attractive to link
other contracts to Libor as well.241 Libor has thus come to play an
important role within the global financial system.242 It is estimated that
worldwide approximately $165-230 trillion in interest rate swaps, $30
trillion in exchange-traded futures and options, $25-30 trillion in
forward rate agreements, $10 trillion in syndicated loans, and $3 trillion
in floating rate notes currently utilize Libor as a benchmark.24 3
Despite its widespread use, however, a perception long existed
in the marketplace that the process by which Libor was set was
fundamentally flawed.244 First, Libor rates were often not based on
actual interbank transactions, but rather panel banks' estimates of their
likely borrowing costs.245 Second, the fact that panel banks were asked
to estimate the price at which they would be able to borrow-as
opposed to lend-gave them an incentive to report rates below their
237 See WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 38.
231 See supra Figure 2.
231 See Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating
Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 189 (2013).
211 See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
241 See WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 7.
242 Id. at7, 11.
243 Id. at 76.
244 See Douglas Keenan, My Thwarted Attempt to Tell of Libor Shenanigans,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 27, 2012, at 13 (alleging that Libor has been
manipulated since at least 1991); Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Special Report:
How Gaming Libor Became Business as Usual, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2012, 7:37
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/1 /20/us-libor-fixing-origins-
idUSBRE8AJOMIHI20121120, archived at http://penna.cc/R5RZ-FG3B (noting
that U.S. regulators were warned of Libor's susceptibility to manipulation as
early as 1996).
245 The reason for this stems from the lack of trading volume and liquidity in a
number of currencies/maturities. The Basics, supra note 231.
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actual cost of debt capital.2 46 Third, and most importantly, the
governance of Libor was plagued by potentially significant conflicts of
interest. As an industry trade association whose governing board is
dominated by panel banks,2 47 the BBA possessed relatively weak
incentives to establish robust oversight mechanisms with a view to
monitoring and enforcing compliance with the rate-setting process.
248
The reliance on self-reporting by panel banks and the absence of a
mechanism for verifying the accuracy of submissions against banks'
true borrowing costs can both be seen as products of these incentives.
249
At the same time, and in sharp contrast, panel banks-as counterparties
to many of the contracts whose payouts are determined with reference
to Libor-possess powerful incentives to manipulate the benchmark
rate.
250
The true nature and extent of these conflicts would begin to
come clear on June 27, 2012, when the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ"), U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"),
and U.K. Financial Services Authority ("FSA") announced that they
had entered into settlement agreements with Barclays Bank PLC-a
longstanding panel member-in connection with the manipulation of
both Libor and its cousin the Euro Interbank Offered Rate
246 See Jon Eisenberg, History Of Alleged Financial Sector Collusion: Part 1,
LAW360 (Apr. 23, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/529847/history-of-alleged-financial-sector-collusion-part-1. Imagine if
your bank asked you what rate of interest they should charge you on a loan.
Notably, there is a London Interbank Bid Rate (or Libid). See London
Interbank Bid Rate (LIBID), NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/
investing/glossary/london-interbank-bid-rate (last visited Nov. 03, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/U3XD-WBDV. Libid, however, has not found
widespread use as a benchmark rate.
247 See BBA Board, BRIT. BANKERS' ASS'N, www.bba.org.uk/about-us/bba-
board/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N5XC-4JDQ.
248 See HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: INITIAL
DISCUSSION PAPER 16 (2012) (U.K.), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/
191763/condoc wheatley review.pdf, archived at http://penma.cc/R44E-
YZTD [hereinafter WHEATLEY INITIAL DISCUSSION].
249 See id.
250 See id. at 3. Perversely, the structure of Libor may have also made it easier
to manipulate. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J.
BANKING& FIN. 136, 137 (2012).
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("Euribor").251 The DOJ, CFTC, and FSA investigations culminating in
the settlements followed on the heels of a Wall Street Journal ("WSf')
investigation which suggested that Libor had diverged from other
measures of risk-thus potentially rendering it an inaccurate proxy for
banks' true borrowing costs-during the early stages of the global
financial crisis.252 The WSJ investigation, in turn, prompted the BBA to
undertake an expedited "consultation" which concluded that panel
banks believed Libor to be "a fundamentally robust and accurate
benchmark, with contributors inputting rates that they believe to reflect
their future funding costs.,253 In effect, the BBA had asked the foxes
whether they thought the henhouse was adequately protected.4
Allegories and inside baseball aside, the DOJ, CFTC, and FSA
investigation uncovered hundreds of attempts by Barclays-both
through its own submissions and in collusion with other financial
institutions-to manipulate Libor between January 2005 and June
2552009. As part of the resulting settlements, Barclays was ordered to
251 See generally Barclays PLC, CFTC Docket No. 12-25 (June 27, 2012);
Barclays Bank Plc, FSA Reference No. 122702 (June 27, 2012) (final notice)
(U.K.); Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits
Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate
and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty
(June 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/barclays-bank-plc-
admits-misconduct-related-submissions-london-interbank-offered-rate-and,
archived at http://perima.cc/HHL3-YJX3.
252 See Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt On Key Rate
Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at Al; Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark
Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate: WSJ Analysis Suggests Banks
May Have Reported Flawed Interest Rate Data for LIBOR, WALL ST. J., May
29, 2008, at Al.
253 BBA Libor Consultation Feedback Statement, BRIT. BANKERS' ASS'N, 3
(Aug. 5, 2008), http://hb.betterregulation.com/external!
BBA%/o20Libor%/ 20Con.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W8F6-B9N3.
254 Remarkably, the BBA arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the fact
that the announcement of the consultation was accompanied by a significant
increase in submitted rates. See Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR Surges After
Scrutiny Does, Too: Banks May be Reacting as BBA Speeds Probe; Impact on
Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2008, at C1.
255 See Barclays PLC, CFTC Docket No. 12-25 (June 27, 2012), at 7-11; U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BARCLAYS BANK PLC NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT:
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5-13 (June 26, 2012) [hereinafter BARCLAYS
STATEMENT OF FACTS], available at http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/9312 0 127 10 17 3 42 63 6 5 94 1.pdf, archived at http://pena.cc/
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pay £59.5 million in fines to the FSA, $200 million to the CFTC, and
$160 million to the DOJ. 6 Barclays also agreed to work with
regulators to implement systems and controls designed to prevent
future misconduct. 7
The Barclays settlement agreements describe two separate
species of Libor rate-nigging. First, traders sought to manipulate
Libor in order to generate profits for the firm and/or its clients on the
basis of their existing trading positions. 9 Given the size of the notional
value of many of the financial contracts-e.g. loans, structured finance
products, and especially swaps and other OTC derivatives-linked to
Libor, a relatively small un-hedged exposure to the benchmark rate
could be the source of significant profits or losses.260 As Connan Snider
and Thomas Youle explain:
If J.P. Morgan, for example, had a swap position with
just a 1% net exposure to the Libor in the fourth
quarter of 2008, then its cost on its contracts would be
proportional to $540 billion. If it was to succeed in
modifying the Libor by 25 basis points in a quarter it
would make 1/4 * 540 * .025 = 0.337 or $337 million
in that quarter. If it had a 10 percent exposure it could
make $3.37 billion.26 1
E-mails, text messages, and other communications disclosed in the
settlement agreements make it clear that Barclays traders were keenly
aware of the opportunities this presented and routinely attempted to
exploit them.262
K2JZ-E88P; Barclays Bank Plc, FSA Reference No. 122702 (June 27, 2012)
(final notice) (U.K.), at 10-14.
256 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 251.
257 Barclays PLC, CFTC Docket No. 12-25 (June 27, 2012), at 34-35.




261 Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks'
Borrowing Costs? 10 (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1569603.
262 See, e.g., BARCLAYS STATEMENT OF FACTS, supra note 255, at 9-11 ("We
have turn exposure of 837 futures contracts. [Flor every 0.25 bps tomorrows
[sic] fix is below 4.0525 we lose 154,687.50 usd [United States Dollars] ... if
tomorrows [sic] fix comes in at 4.0325 we lose 618,750 usd.") (alterations in
original) (quoting a Barclays trader).
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Second, in the midst of the financial crisis, Barclays submitted
artificially low rates in order to avoid media scrutiny surrounding its
financial health, along with the adverse inferences which might be
drawn by market participants and regulators from the fact that they
were submitting rates higher than many other panel banks.263 Rather
than profit, this second species of manipulation was thus motivated by
the fear that if Barclays were to be perceived as having difficulty
raising funds in the interbank market, this might trigger the sort of
destabilizing runs that, by September 2007, had already claimed the
likes of Northern Rock and would soon claim Bear Steams.264 This fear
resulted in the now infamous instruction from one Barclays manager to
Libor submitters that the firm should not "stick its head above the
parapet."265 Thereafter, Barclays consistently submitted rates that fell
within the mid-range of panel banks.266
The Barclays settlement was followed by a flurry of further
announcements regarding Libor-related investigations, fines, and
settlements. On December 19, 2012, Union Bank of Switzerland
("UBS") announced that it had entered into settlement agreements
totaling $1.5 billion with the DOJ, CFTC, FSA, and Swiss Financial
Markets Authority relating to the manipulation of Libor and Euribor
between January 2005 and December 2010.267 On February 6, 2013,
Royal Bank of Scotland ("RBS") announced that it, too, had agreed to
pay over $600 million to the DOJ, CFTC, and FSA in order to settle
claims of Libor manipulation.268 Then the European Commission got
263 Barclays Bank Plc, FSA Reference No. 122702 (June 27, 2012) (final
notice) (U.K.), at 23-29.
264 See Rotten Heart, supra note 225, at 26.
265 Barclays Bank Plc, FSA Reference No. 122702 (June 27, 2012) (final
notice) (U.K.), at 25.266 Id. at 29.
267 See generally UBS AG, CFTC Docket No. 13-09 (Dec. 19, 2012); UBS
AG, FSA Reference No. 186958 (Dec. 19, 2012) (final notice) (U.K.); Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty to
Felony Wire Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark
Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-
securities-japan-co-ltd-plead-guilty-felony-wire-fraud-long-nning-
manipulation-libor, archived at http://penua.cc/B89D-5UMU.
261 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to
Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor
Benchmark Interest Rates (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/rbs-securities-japan-limited-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-
running-manipulation-libor, archived at http://perma.cc/7GKB-JWZS. Since
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into the act, fining Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Socitd Gdndral, RBS,
UBS, JP Morgan, Citigroup, and RP Martin over C1.71 billion for
participating in an illegal cartel in the market for certain interest rates
derivatives.269 To date, investigations by securities regulators, antitrust
authorities, and other agencies have now been launched in the United
States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the Netherlands,
Germany, Canada, Japan, Singapore, and Switzerland looking into
allegations that perhaps as many as twenty banks attempted to
manipulate Libor, Euribor, and other benchmark rates.270 Together,
these authorities have thus far handed out over $6.3 billion in fines.27'
then, both Lloyds and Rabobank have also entered into settlement agreements
with the DOJ, CFTC, and the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (the successor
to the FSA). Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Lloyds Banking Group Admits
Wrongdoing in LIBOR Investigation, Agrees to Pay $86 Million Criminal
Penalty (July 28, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/lloyds-
banking-group-admits-wrongdoing-libor-investigation-agrees-pay-86-million-
criminal, archived at http://perma.cc/N3G7-GVP9; Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Rabobank Admits Wrongdoing in Libor Investigation, Agrees to Pay
$325 Million Criminal Penalty (Oct. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rabobank-admits-wrongdoing-libor-
investigation-agrees-pay-325 -million-criminal-penalty, archived at
http://perma.cc/627N-8JHC. Rabobank has also entered into a separate
settlement agreement with the Dutch National Public Prosecutor's Office.
Rabobank pays Dutch Public Prosecutor f 70 million to Settle LIBOR-
Investigation, OPENBAAR IVINISTERIE (Oct. 29, 2013),
https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@32207/mbobank-pays-dutch/
[hereinafter Rabobank Pays Dutch], archived at http://perma.cc/ULC7-CVPZ.
269 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Banks E
1.71 Billion for Participating in Cartels in the Interest Rate Derivatives
Industry (Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-
13-1208 en.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/RV9-D9VD.
270 See Rotten Heart, supra note 225, at 25; Rabobank Pays Dutch, supra note
268; Mark Thompson, Singapore Raps 30 Banks for Trying to Rig Rates, CNN
MONEY (June 14, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/
14/news/companies/singapore-banks-sibor/, archived at http://perma.cc/
KY2Y-NPYP.
271 $6.3 billion is the result of the Author's own calculations based on the data
available to him as of August 2014. This figure includes fines, but not
disgorgement or compensation, extracted from Barclays, Deutsche Bank,
Socitd Gdndral, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, JP Morgan, Citigroup, RP
Martin, Lloyds, and Rabobank by the DOJ, FSA, CFTC, Swiss Financial
Markets Authority, Dutch National Public Prosecutor's Office, and/or
European Conmiission. This calculation appears entirely reasonable when
considered in conjunction with a 2012 Financial Times article that predicted
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In the final tally, however, this figure may well be considerably higher
as many investigations are ongoing and a number of new investigations
have recently been announced.272
The Libor scandal is remarkable in several important respects.
The first is the scale of the manipulation. The UBS investigation, to
take just one example, revealed thousands of attempts to manipulate
Libor involving dozens of employees and at least six other firms.
273
Moreover, far from being an isolated incident, it seems increasingly
likely that the manipulation of Libor and other benchmark rates was a
common practice amongst panel banks.274 Second, as The Economist
aptly described it, the settlement agreements give a sense of "the very
everydayness with which bank traders set about manipulating the most
important figure in finance.275 There was "at least one [Barclays]
trader... [who] would shout across the [trading floor] to confirm that"
no one held positions which might conflict with his attempts to
influence Barclays' Libor submissions.76 Other traders wrote diary
notes to themselves, reminding them to speak with Libor submitters
about manipulating the benchmark rate.277 Third, ostensible competitors
were willing to collude with one another in the manipulation of
Libor. 278 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, despite the widespread
that banks connected to the Libor scandal could face as high as $22 billion in
fines. Brooke Masters & Alex Barker, Banks Face $22bn Libor Bill, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 13, 2012, at 1.
272 See, e.g., Caroline Binham & Alice Ross, Ex-Deutsche Trader Faces
Euribor Probe, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), June 7, 2014, at 8; Caroline Binham, RBS
Libor Probe to Drag on to Next Year, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Aug. 11, 2014, at 12
(reporting on the ongoing criminal probe into RBS's activities); Philip
Stafford, Brussels Accuses ICAP over Yen Cartels; Broker Denies
'Facilitating' System, FIN. TIMES (London), June 11, 2014, at 18; Alex Barker,
Brussels Charges Three Banks Over Euribor Fixing Cartel, FIN. TIMES (May
20, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/dO8b458a-eO13-11e3-
b709-00144feabdc0.html (reporting that the European Commission had
charged HSBC, JP Morgan, and Cidit Agricole with participating in an illegal
cartel to rig Euribor).
273 UBS AG, FSA Reference No. 186958 (Dec. 19, 2012) (final notice) (U.K.),
at 2-4.
274 See Rotten Heart, supra note 225, at 25.
275 Id.
276 Barclays Bank Plc, FSA Reference No. 122702 (June 27, 2012) (final
notice) (U.K.), at 10.
277 Rotten Heart, supra note 225, at 25.
278 Id. at 26.
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perception prior to the scandal that the Libor rate-setting process was
vulnerable to manipulation by panel banks, there was no serious
attempt by market participants to develop alternative market
structures.27 9
The Libor scandal has spurred a fundamental review of the
regulation of financial benchmarks. Some of the proposed reforms-
and specifically those recommended by the U.K.'s Wheatley Review-
are examined below.280 First, however, we must ask ourselves what the
Libor scandal can teach us about the conflicts of interest embedded
within the Big Bang Protocol and why private ordering is unlikely to
effectively address them. It is to these questions which we now turn.
V. The Parallels Between Libor and the DC Mechanism
There are a number of important parallels between Libor and
the DC mechanism. These parallels include the identity of the key
players, their privileged market position, and the opportunities this
position presents for unscrupulous behavior. More importantly, in both
cases, the market forces which we might otherwise expect to constrain
this behavior are impeded by the very success of these market
structures, along with the market power enjoyed by a small group of
financial intermediaries. This is not to suggest that the two case studies
are somehow identical. Libor is clearly a more important and
ubiquitous component of the global financial system. It is used not only
to price commercial loans, derivatives, and other sophisticated financial
instruments, but also mortgages, credit cards, and other investment
products offered to retail consumers.281 Accordingly, we might expect
revelations about widespread manipulation of Libor and other
benchmark rates to have a more profound impact-both in
distributional terms, and in terms of overall market confidence.
Nevertheless, the parallels are sufficiently striking that our examination
279 See WHEATLEY INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 248, at 16.
211 See infra Part VJ(a).
211 See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The
New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses,
15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 357, 378-79 (2013). At the same time, the fact that
derivatives markets are generally thought to be populated by more
sophisticated market participants may be viewed by some as justifying a more
laissez faire approach toward public regulatory intervention designed to
constmin unscrupulous behavior. See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of
Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1993, 2003-06 (1995).
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of Libor can arguably provide us with useful insights into the potential
vulnerabilities of the DC mechanism.
The first and most basic parallel between Libor and the DC
mechanism stems from the identity of the principal protagonists: DC
members and Libor panel banks. Figure 5 lists the G16 group of global
derivatives dealers28 2 and indicates whether they are also panel banks
for U.S. dollar Libor and DC members for the Americas region.283 As
Figure 5 illustrates, the overlap between these three groups is
substantial, with nine institutions falling into all three groups.284
Figure 5: Membership of the G16 on Libor and DC panels
(as of April 28, 2014)




BNP Paribas ,/ ,/
282 The G14 group of dealers expanded in 2011 and 2012 to become the G16.
Matt Cameron, G14 Dealer Group Adds Two Members, Risk.net (Dec. 1,
2011), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2127940/g14-dealer-adds.
211 See John Biggins, 'Targeted Touchdown' and 'Partial Liftoff': Post-Crisis
Dispute Resolution in the OTC Derivatives Markets and the Challenge for
ISDA, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1297, 1303-04 (2012) (listing the G16 group of global
derivatives dealers); Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n ISDA
Announces Annual Determinations Committees Outcome (Mar. 31, 2014),
available at http ://www2.isda.org/news/isda-announces-annual-
determinations-committees-outcome0, archived at http://pena.cc/HW55-
3ADA (listing the DC members); ICE LIBOR: Panel Composition,
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.com/iba/libor (last visited
Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8N5F-3JA6 (listing the LIBOR
panel banks for all currencies). Membership is listed at the group parent
company level in Figure 5. In practice, membership on Libor panels or DCs
often falls to subsidiaries or affiliates within these groups.
284 This sum excludes Socitd Gdndrale, which acts as a consultative dealer on
the DC for the Americas but does not have the right to vote on determinations.
Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, supra note 283.
2014-2015
REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW
Citigroup
Credit Agnicole
Credit Suisse / /
Deutsche Bank / /
Goldman Sachs /
HSBC V/ V/
JPMorgan Chase / /
Morgan Stanley /
Nomura Group /
Royal Bank of V"
Scotland
Socidt6 Gdndrale / v(consultative)
UBS V/ V/
Wells Fargo
A second and related parallel is that both Libor and the DC
mechanism are structured around a core group of market participants.
There are two distinguishing features of this core. First, the market
participants which comprise this core often dominate the markets for
the financial products and services of which Libor and the DC
mechanism are simply component parts. In the United Kingdom, for
example, four banks account for the lion's share of commercial
lending.285 Each of these banks is a Libor panel member.28 6 And as we
have already seen, the G16 enjoy a similar share of the global market
2871for swaps and other OTC derivatives. Second, by virtue of market
structures such as Libor and the DC mechanism, this core is in a
privileged position to influence otherwise exogenous events-e.g.
changes to the Libor rate, credit events, etc.-which determine the
285 These banks are Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, and RBS. For a recent study of
competition in the U.K. commercial banking sector, see COMPETITION &
MKTS. AuTH. & FIN. CONDUCT AuTH., BANKING SERVICES TO SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: A CMA AND FCA MARKET STUDY 22 n.16
(2014), available at https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/
53eb6b73ed915d188800000c/SME-report final.pdf [hereinafter CMA &
FCA], archived at http://perima.cc/8A3A-VXJF.
216 See ICE LIBOR: Panel Composition, supra note 283.
287 See supra text accompanying note 107.
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payoffs under contracts to which they are themselves significant
counterparties. This, in turn, gives rise to hardwired conflicts of interest
between this core group and the other, peripheral, market participants.
Ultimately, of course, we might view this state of affairs as
largely unproblematic so long as the internal governance mechanisms
built into these market structures successfully constrain such conflicts
of interest. Here, however, we encounter another important set of
parallels. As described above, the BBA's reliance on the unverified
submissions of panel banks-submissions which did not need to be
based on actual interbank transactions-left Libor vulnerable to
manipulation.288 Despite these and other widely acknowledged flaws,
however, the BBA failed to vigorously monitor or enforce compliance
with the Libor rate-setting process.289 Indeed, the BBA's failure to
provide meaningful oversight continued even after the WSJ and others
produced evidence that was, at the very least, suggestive of pervasive
rate rigging.290
ISDA has taken an equally hands-off approach toward the
monitoring and enforcement of DC Rules.291 In effect, ISDA is
ostensibly relying on the fact that DC members have entered into
agreements-notably with ISDA, and not their counterparties-stating
that they will comply with them.292 Indeed, even if the leadership of
ISDA or the BBA did wish to take a more proactive approach toward
monitoring compliance with these rules and processes, one might
reasonably question whether these organizations-as industry trade
associations-would have been able to generate a critical mass of
support from their membership.293 This question is particularly salient
for organizations such as ISDA, where the concentrated, dealer-
intermediated nature of OTC derivatives markets can be seen as giving
global dealers considerable influence, if not a de facto veto, over the
organizational agenda.294
Even where these internal governance mechanisms fail to
constrain the conflicts of interest embedded within these market
structures, we might still look to external, or market-based, monitoring
288 See supra text accompanying notes 244-50.
289 See supra text accompanying notes 247-49.
291 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
291 See supra text accompanying notes 215-17.
292 DCRules, supra note 183, § 1.8(b).
293 See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
291 See Judge, supra note 73 (manuscript at 13-15); Partnoy & Skeel, supra
note 132, at 1037-39.
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and enforcement. That is to say that if a particular market structure is
viewed by participants as being inefficient, vulnerable to manipulation,
or otherwise undesirable, we would expect to observe the emergence of
29new, more desirable, market structures.  These market structures
might be developed by new entrants seeking to attract market share, or
by incumbents looking to stay one step ahead of the nascent
competition.296 Indeed, as described above, this competitive dynamic is
frequently held out as one of the most important benefits of private
ordering: spurring a process of experimentation and updating, which
results in progressively more desirable market structures.297 Viewed
from this perspective, however, we are left with something of a puzzle:
why, despite their widely acknowledged flaws, have we not observed
the emergence of any legitimate challengers to Libor or the DC
mechanism? Put differently, in an industry we often think of as being
characterized by fierce competition and relentless innovation, why have
we not witnessed the emergence and widespread adoption of a new and
improved Big Bang Protocol or Libor 2. 0?298
One explanation might be that the designers of Libor and the
DC mechanism got it right the first time around. Another might be that
the market has not yet had sufficient time to effectively respond. While
these possibilities cannot be completely discounted, however, both
logic and recent experience suggest hat it may be prudent to head out
in search of other, more compelling, explanations. It is at this point that
the limits of private ordering-positive network externalities, path
dependency, and power imbalances-may hold significant explanatory
power.
The first potential explanation resides in the positive network
externalities associated with successful market structures such as Libor
and the DC mechanism. These network externalities are a natural
byproduct of the benefits these market structures generate for market
participants. As described above, these benefits flow principally from
standardization. Libor is, in effect, a standardized methodology for
295 See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
296 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
29' For greater clarity, the salient question here is not simply why potential
substitutes did not exist-they did (e.g. the General Collateral Financing
("GCF") Repo Index is in many respects a substitute for Libor)-but rather
why they did not pose a meaningful competitive thiat to these incumbent
market structures. See Kristin Dooley, Development Article, The LIBOR
Scandal, 32 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 2,11 (2013).
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299calculating benchmark interest rates. In addition to lowering
negotiation and drafting costs for market participants, the widespread
use of Libor in a diverse range of different financial products makes it
less costly for these market participants to minimize interest rate basis
risk at the portfolio level.300 The DC mechanism is, similarly, designed
to eliminate any legal basis risk arising from divergent interpretations
of certain key terms of ISDA's credit derivatives documentation.30'
Market participants thus possess powerful incentives not only to use
Libor and the DC mechanism themselves, but to exert pressure on their
counterparties to ensure that they use these market structures as well.
Viewed in this light, the benefits of both Libor and the DC mechanism
can be understood as flowing not only from their desirability per se, but
also from the mere fact of their widespread adoption.
Market participants looking to mount a challenge to these
incumbent market structures are thus confronted with something of a
bleak calculus. If they invest in the development of new market
structures to challenge the dominance of Libor or the DC mechanism, it
is very likely that these structures will be unable to attract a critical
mass of market participants.3 °2 If they successfully overcome the
attendant coordination problems, meanwhile, other market participants
will inevitably be able to free-ride off their investment.30 3 As a result, it
may be individually rational for market participants to refrain from
making such investments, even where they would yield what might
collectively be viewed as a more desirable equilibrium.30 4 The net effect
is a failure of the market to spur investment in welfare enhancing
innovation.
305
The second potential explanation is path dependence. In the
event that market forces did spur the development of potentially viable
substitutes for Libor or the DC mechanism, market participants would
still have to evaluate whether the prospective benefits associated with
299 See supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 237-40. Where different benchmarks
are used for different products, in contrast, market participants will need to
concern themselves with the residual economic exposures created by any
differences in the methodologies for calculating these benchmarks. See
WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 45-46.
301 See supra text accompanying note 205.
302 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
34 See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
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these new market structures exceeded the costs of switching.306 In many
cases, these costs may prove quite substantial.317 In addition to
switching market structures going forward, of course, market
participants would also very likely want to switch their existing
transactions, thus retaining the hedging and other benefits derived from
standardization.308 We would expect the costs of switching these
existing transactions to be particularly high in the case of Libor.3°9
These costs are a function of both Libor's ubiquity as a financial
benchmark, and the fact that the governance and ownership structures
of many of the financial instruments in which it is embedded-e.g.
syndicated loans, structured finance vehicles, and mortgages
repackaged into mortgage-backed securities-may generate acute
coordination problems which render switching more difficult. 310 The
bilateral nature of CDS markets, in contrast, theoretically presents
relatively few coordination problems. Moreover, ISDA has already
developed a market structure-protocols-that facilitates such ex post
switching .311 The problem in this case, however, is that the introduction
of a protocol enabling market participants to switch from the DC
mechanism to an alternative market structure is dependent on the
incentives of ISDA, along with the global derivatives dealers it
represents, to invest in its development.
This takes us squarely on to the third and final potential
explanation for why private ordering may fail to effectively respond to
the problems at the heart of Libor and the DC mechanism: the power
imbalances between the market participants at the core of these market
structures and those at the periphery. These power imbalances stem
from several different sources. The first is market position.312 There are
a number of important distinctions between Libor panel banks and DC
members in terms of market position. As we have already seen, global
derivatives dealers represent the primary source of market access,
trading information, and liquidity within swaps and other OTC
306 See supra text accompanying note 69.
307 See Kraus, supra note 69, at 378.
308 See, e.g., WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 46.
309 See id.
3'0 For a discussion of these coordination problems, see Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 702-03 (2012).
311 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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derivatives markets.313 Indeed, these dealers are uniquely suited to this
market-making role. First, their global client networks reduce the
search costs of matching counterparties on opposite sides of a trade.314
Second, their expertise in risk management and enormous diversified
balance sheets enable them to evaluate and absorb counterparty credit,
market, and other risks more efficiently than other intermediaries.
315
Dealers are thus central-indeed, essential-to the smooth and efficient
operation of global derivatives markets. The market position of Libor
panel banks, in contrast, depends more on domestic market conditions.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the position of Libor panel banks
is extremely strong.3 16 In the United States, in contrast, where both
retail and commercial banking markets are far more fragmented, the
position of Libor panel banks may not be the source of significant
317market power.
The second source of potential power imbalances stems from
the ability of Libor panel banks and DC members to bundle these
market structures together with other products. Derivatives dealers, for
example, are able to bundle their most important product-market
liquidity-together with other complementary products such as Libor
and ISDA's credit derivatives documentation. At the same time, only
market participants utilizing ISDA credit derivatives documentation are
permitted to adopt the Big Bang Protocol; and only those who have
adopted the Big Bang Protocol can use the DC and auction settlement
mechanisms.318 In effect, this bundling enables dealers to anchor
derivatives markets to incumbent market structures. As forthrightly
observed by leading global law firm Ropes & Gray LLP in its
assessment of the Big Bang Protocol:
If history is any guide, the dealer community will
likely require that counterparties incorporate the terms
of the [Big Bang Protocol] into every confirmation for
future transactions. Meaning that, at least on a going-
313 See supra text accompanying notes 87-107.
311 See Van Zandt, supra note 96, at 996.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
316 See CMA & FCA, supra note 285, at 41.
317 See Banking Brief: U.S. Banking System-Scaled to Serve, CLEARING
HOUSE (Feb. 7, 2013), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/issues/banking-
brief/bank-structure-and-consumer-protection/us-banking-system-scaled-to-
serve, archived at http://perma.cc/3K7K-BT6K.
318 See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
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forward basis, parties wishing to transact in the CDS
market will have to live with ISDA's CDS changes.319
Put bluntly, if a market participant does not want to play by their rules,
dealers can simply take their ball and go home.
The third source of potential power imbalances stems from the
relative opacity of both the markets in which Libor and the DC
mechanism are used and the balance sheets of Libor panel banks and
derivatives dealers. While many market participants suspected that
Libor panel banks were submitting inaccurate rates, for example, this
was incredibly difficult to verify-especially since submissions were
not required to reflect actual interbank transactions, but only the
perceptions of panel banks.320 Along a similar vein, given their far from
complete access to information regarding the trading positions of other
financial institutions, market participants can generally only speculate
as to whether DC members might be voting their book. This opacity is
exacerbated by three factors. First, as we have seen, both Libor and the
DC mechanism rely heavily on the discretion of core market
participants.321 By its very nature, however, second-guessing the
exercise of this discretion is fraught with conceptual and evidential
challenges. What is the appropriate standard for determining whether
the exercise of discretion is acceptable? Does the exercise of discretion
in any given case meet this standard? And, if not, was this due to an
"honest" mistake or a more malevolent attempt to exploit this discretion
for private gain? These are inherently difficult questions to answer
without resort to the powers-and expense-of discovery and cross-
examination typically associated with formal litigation.322 Second, and
relatedly, where information is in the public domain it is often
319 ISDA Aims for "Fungible" CDS with Auction Settlement, Big Bang
Protocol, and New Standard North American CDS Terms, ROPES & GRAY
LLP, 3 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.ropesgmy.com/-/media/Files/alerts/
2009/03/isda-aims-for-fungible-cds-with-auction-settlement-big-bang-
protocol-and-new-standard-north-american-cds-tenns.ashx, archived at
http://perma.cc/B63C-QGFE. Compounding matters, market participants not
adhering to the Big Bang Protocol are unable to "opt-in" to the auction
settlement mechanism. See Big Bang Protocol: Frequently Asked Questions,
INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, http://www.isda.org/bigbangprot/
bbprot faq.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://penma.cc/S7JZ-
VKZ3.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 244-49.
321 See supra Figure 5.
322 This also applies to an investigation by public regulatory authorities.
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susceptible to multiple interpretations. A unanimous or near unanimous
DC decision, for example, could be interpreted either as evidence of
collusion or simply as evidence that the matter in question was a
relatively straightforward one.323  Finally, where core market
participants engage in conduct that might be considered an abuse of
discretion, we might expect them to go to great lengths to conceal it
from view. Indeed, if those responsible for attempting to manipulate
Libor had not been so brazen as to document their skullduggery in e-
324mails and text messages, it seems highly unlikely that the full nature
and extent of these activities would have ever come to light. In an
environment where observable information is often scarce-and
verifiable information even more so-it thus seems somewhat unlikely
that external governance mechanisms would provide a meaningful
constraint on opportunistic behavior.325
In the absence of effective internal or external governance
mechanisms, we would expect private market structures such as Libor
and the DC mechanism to be vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by
core market participants. In the case of Libor, this abuse manifested
itself in the form of widespread fraud and manipulation, collusion
amongst panel banks, and the submission of rates which did not reflect
panel banks' true borrowing costs.32 6 In the case of the DC mechanism,
meanwhile, this behavior might manifest itself in several ways. First, as
described above, DC members might simply vote their book.327 Indeed,
the fact that ISDA's general counsel has floated the possibility of a
best-practice policy in this area-if not actually produced one328-can
be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the vulnerability of the DC
mechanism to this sort of opportunistic behavior. Given the
323 Similarly, it would be difficult to draw any strong conclusions simply from
the dispersion of Libor submissions.
324 See supra text accompanying note 262.
325 One potential difference between Libor and the DC mechanism in this
regard may be the salience of the relevant decisions. Specifically, whereas the
Libor rte-setting process occurs on a daily basis, DC decisions are more
infrequent and highly salient to a particular group of market participants.
Theoretically, this salience could translate into greater market scrutiny. See
Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation,
14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 300 (1997) (explaining that "more thorough public
scutiny... accompanies high salience issues").
326 See supra text accompanying notes 251-72.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
328 See Pollack, supra note 1.
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supermajority threshold for most important determinations,329 however,
a dealer voting its book in insolation would seem somewhat less likely
to yield the desired effect. This, of course, raises the prospect that DC
members might collude to rig determinations. More specifically, DC
members might engage in the sort of "you scratch my back" behavior
in exchange for future reciprocity as exposed by the Libor scandal.330
Third, DC members might trade on the basis of insider information
regarding an impending request for, or outcome of, a determination.
Such insider trading could take place in both the relevant reference
obligation itself or, crucially, other correlated assets.3 3'
A reasonable observer might once again raise a number of
objections at this point. First, as ISDA has itself argued, the DC Rules,
the identity of DC members, and the determinations themselves are all
fully disclosed.332 Indeed, as a theoretical matter, so long as contracting
parties are made aware of the attendant agency costs, we might
ultimately expect these costs to be reflected in the price of the relevant
contract.3 3 In practice, however, disclosure of the DC Rules is not the
same thing as highlighting the latent conflicts of interest which reside
therein; nor, more importantly, does it provide an effective substitute
for disclosing the trading positions of DC members as a means of
determining the true nature and extent of any conflicts. Moreover,
disclosure is of little value-and the price mechanism unlikely to
function effectively-in a market characterized by positive network
externalities, path dependency, and power imbalances. Second, one
might argue that the presence of buy-side members on DCs serves to
321 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
331 See David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, Clubby London Trading Scene
Fostered Rate-Fixing Scandal, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2013, at Al.
331 As an empirical matter, it would be interesting to study the movement of
prices in the reference obligation and other correlated assets both before and
immediately following the announcement of DC decisions. However, insofar
as it is often difficult to filter out other variables impacting price, the results of
such empirical work would likely not be determinative. Moreover, a given
observation might also be subject to multiple interpretations. For example, any
"unusual" price movement in advance of an announcement could be suggestive
of insider trading or, alternatively, market participants making legitimate bets
on the basis of previous DC precedent.
332 See Lisa Pollack, More on the Conflicted Isda Committee, FT ALPHAVILLE
(Dec. 14, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/12/14/799741/more-
on-the-conflicted-isda-committee/.
333 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31, at 312-13.
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make collusion more difficult.33 4 This may indeed be the case.
Simultaneously, however, it must be recognized that even these non-
dealer members, by virtue of their elevated status within the market
structure, are part of the core group of market participants and may thus
enjoy similar incentives to game the system.335 Finally, one might
observe that at least some of this conduct-insider trading and
collusion, for example-is against the law. While this may be true, the
real question is whether the law is backed up by a credible enforcement
threat. In the case of Libor, it appears that this threat was insufficiently
credible.336 This was likely due in large part to the market opacity and
resulting information problems described above.337 These same
problems undermine the threat of both market-based reputational
sanctions and public regulatory enforcement in connection with the
exploitation of the conflicts of interest embedded within the DC
mechanism.
338
The central claim of this Article is not that global derivatives
dealers are currently exploiting the conflicts of interest embedded
within the DC mechanism in the same way that many of these same
institutions have recently admitted to manipulating Libor. We simply
do not-and arguably cannot-know on the basis of publicly available
information whether or not this is indeed the case. What this Article is
claiming, however, is that the parallels between Libor and the DC
mechanism-the key players, their privileged market position, the
opportunities for abuse, and the absence of effective internal or external
governance mechanisms-collectively suggest that the DC mechanism
is vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. The next section, therefore, puts
forward a small number of relatively modest, straightforward
334 See supra notes 187, 189 and accompanying text.
335 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. Indeed, the buy-side/sell-side
dichotomy has never been entirely apt within OTC derivatives markets. Unlike
primary markets for debt and equity where these terms originated, dealers and
non-dealers within secondary and OTC derivatives markets are not inherently
long (i.e. buy-side) or short (i.e. sell-side). Put differently, a dealer and non-
dealer may have the same exposure to a given asset, whether it is long, short, or
neutral. As a result, there is no inherent conflict of interest.
336 See WHEATLEY INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 248, at 16 ("[I]t is not clear
that the oversight function carried out by the Oversight subcommittee has
either the capacity-in terms of resource and expertise-or the appropriate
sanctions to detect, investigate and enforce against misconduct effectively.").
337 See supra text accompanying notes 320-25.
338 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
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prescriptions designed to limit the scope for such behavior. In this as in
all things, an ounce of prevention may be worth a pound of cure.
VI. Pushing the Limits: Regulatory and Governance Strategies
How can we push the limits of private ordering? Put
differently, how can we better balance the trade-offs between the costs
and benefits generated by successful market structures? Ultimately,
these trade-offs are inherently case-specific. What is most important,
then, is recognizing where these limits exist, understanding their impact
on the incentives of market participants, and weighing the inevitable
trade-offs. Only then can potential regulatory or governance strategies
be identified. This section identifies potential governance and
regulatory strategies which might be used to reduce the information,
agency, and other costs embedded within Libor and the DC
mechanism, along with a preliminary assessment of their attendant
trade-offs. Notably, each of the strategies canvassed in this section
envisions some form of public regulatory intervention. Such
intervention is arguably necessary in order to overcome the inertia
generated by the limits of private ordering. At the same time, however,
once this intervention takes place, the changes to these market
structures necessary in order to ameliorate the underlying problems are
in many cases relatively straightforward, modest, and easy to
implement.339
A. Libor
At the heart of the Libor scandal was the failure of the BBA to
vigorously monitor and enforce compliance with the rate-setting
process.340 Most importantly, the BBA failed to verify the accuracy and
independence of the rates submitted by panel banks.341 This failure has
spurred public regulatory authorities in several jurisdictions to
fundamentally rethink how they approach the regulation of financial
benchmarks. In the U.K., for example, the Wheatley Review has
33' This, of course, is consistent with this Article's broader thesis: that the
limits of private ordering undermine welfare enhancing innovation, even when
the enhancements are not costly to make (once we exclude the lost
opportunities for rent-seeking which incumbent market structures generate for
some market participants).
340 See WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 21.
341 See WHEATLEY INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 248, at 16.
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recommended-and the government has largely implemented-a series
of wholesale reforms.3 42 First, the administration of Libor and the
submission of Libor rates by panel banks have both become "regulated
activities" under the Financial Services and Markets Act,3 43 thus
explicitly bringing these activities under the umbrella of a public
regulatory framework. These activities have also been designated
"controlled functions" with the individuals responsible for overseeing
them subject to the Financial Conduct Authority's ("FCA") 344 approved
persons regime.345 Second, day-to-day governance and oversight of
Libor has been taken away from the BBA and given to a new,
independent administrator.346 This new administrator is responsible for,
amongst other matters, compiling submissions, verifying their accuracy
against actual interbank transactions, and publishing official Libor
rates.347 The administrator is required to establish and maintain
effective governance arrangements to carry out this role (including the
management of any conflicts of interest), ultimately with a view to
maintaining the integrity and continuity of the benchmark.348 The
administrator is also required to establish an oversight committee
comprised of panel banks, market infrastructure providers, benchmark
users, and at least two independent non-executive directors .349 Together
with this oversight committee, the administrator is responsible for
establishing practice standards for panel banks governing, among other
things, the methodology for determining submissions, management of
conflicts of interest, use of transaction data, recordkeeping, internal
systems and controls, and external audit requirements .350 The
administrator is also responsible for identifying and reporting breaches
342 See WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 8-9.
343 Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, § 7 (U.K.).
344 The FCA replaced the FSA as the U.K.'s financial conduct regulator on
April 1, 2013. UK Financial Regulation Overhauled, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31,
2013, 8:06 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21987829, archived at
http://perma.cc/J286-Z8SK.
345 See generally FIN. SERV. AUTH., POLICY STATEMENT 13/6, THE
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF BENCHMARKS 12-13 (2013), available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/fsa-ps 13-06.pcf,
archived at http://perma.cc/S93R-PF6J.
346 See supra note 229.
347 See FIN. SERV. AuTH., supra note 345, at 9-10.
348 Id. at 9-12.
349 Id. at 12-13.
350 Id. at 18.
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of these standards or potentially manipulative behavior to the FCA.351
Finally, it is envisioned that new civil and criminal penalties will
eventually be introduced for intentionally or recklessly making false or
misleading statements in connection with the setting of a benchmark.352
Broadly similar reforms targeting financial benchmarks have also been
proposed at the European level.
353
The Wheatley Review's approach toward the regulation of
financial benchmarks can be understood as an acknowledgment of the
trade-offs embedded within private market structures such as Libor.
There can be little doubt that panel banks are best positioned to
produce-if not necessarily verify-information about prevailing
market conditions as this information is a natural byproduct of their
own capital raising activities. At the same time, however, these market
participants-along with the industry associations that represent their
interests-may be poorly incentivized to provide meaningful ex ante
oversight of the rate-setting process or, where necessary, pursue
vigorous ex post enforcement in relation to misconduct.354 By bringing
these activities within the scope of a public regulatory framework,
introducing new civil and criminal penalties, and bonding the
reputation of the administrator to the integrity of the benchmark, these
reforms can thus be understood as an attempt to enhance the credibility
of commitments made by both the administrator and panel banks.355
This, in turn, could conceivably help restore market confidence in the
scandal-tainted benchmark.
The Wheatley Review's recommendations were also shaped by
the view that the new administrator would be more responsive than
public regulatory authorities to the evolving demands of market
351 Id. at 14-15.
352 See WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 18-19.
353 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and
Financial Contracts, at 2-3, COM (2013) 641 final (Sept. 18, 2013);
Principles for Financial Benchmarks: Final Report, INT'L ORG. SEC.
COMMISSIONS, 3-4 (July 2013), http://www.iosco.org/libraiy/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/66TQ-Q75S; Reforming
Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, 1-3 (July 22, 2014),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 140722.pcf, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZC7H-H3Z2.
354 See WHEATLEY INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 248, at 16.
355 See supra note 5. This, however, ultimately hinges on the ability of the FCA
to maintain a credible enforcement hreat.
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participants.356 Here, however, we encounter another set of potentially
significant trade-offs. On July 9, 2013, it was announced that a
subsidiary of NYSE Euronext would be appointed as the new
administrator.357 On November 13, 2013, NYSE Euronext was
acquired by Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. ("ICE"), a leading global
operator of financial exchanges and clearinghouses.358 This raises an
important question: why would ICE-the world's largest operator of
equity and derivatives exchange platforms359-want to administer a
scandal-tainted benchmark? The answer, of course, is that ICE can
bundle it with both its existing market data services and, crucially,
license it as a component part of the derivatives and other financial
products it offers via its global network of options, futures, and
commodities exchanges, and alternative trading platforms such as ICE
Swap Trade, Creditex, and NYSE Liffe.36° On its face, then, the
decision to appoint NYSE Euronext (and now ICE)-as opposed to a
truly independent third party-seems likely to further cement Libor as
"the most important figure in finance."361 On the one hand, this may be
viewed as a positive development insofar as the threat of losing a
valuable revenue stream may incentivize ICE to ensure that Libor is
well governed and free from manipulation.362 On the other hand,
356 WHEATLEY FINAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 13.
357 Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Euronext Subsidiary to Become
New Administrator of Libor (July 9, 2013), available at
http://www 1.nyse.com/press/1373365567815.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/ST4X-E3YH. The transfer was completed on February 1, 2014.
See About Us, supra note 229.
358 Press Release, Intercontinental Exch., IntercontinentalExchange Completes
Acquisition of NYSE Euronext (Nov. 13, 2013), available at
http://otp.investis.com/clients/us/intercontinental exchangegroup/usn/usnews
-story.aspx?cid=953&newsid=21126, archived at http://perma.cc/4N7T-8FLN.
359 For a more detailed description of the business and operations of ICE, see
generally IntercontinentalExchange Grp., Annual Report (Fom 10-K) (Feb. 14,
2014).
360 Indeed, market participants looking to use Libor as a reference rate or in its
pricing activities must enter into a licensing arrangement with ICE Benchmark
Administration Limited, the ICE subsidiary appointed as Libor's new
administrator. See ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA): Licensing,
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, http://www.tlieice.com/iba/licensing (last
visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/36UX-K9SH.
361 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
362 See Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law,
Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 43-45
(2013).
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however, the bundling of Libor with other products seems likely to
generate further network externalities and enhance the market power of
ICE.363 Accordingly, this strategy may ultimately serve to erect further
barriers to entry for new market structures and undermine the threat of
market-based sanctions that-as the Wheatley Review hoped-would
compel the administrator to respond to market demand.364
Ultimately, if the new administrator cannot be counted upon to
respond to exogenous demand, this raises another important question:
why not cut out the middleman? Why not simply have panel banks
make their submissions directly to public regulatory authorities or, at
the very least, a third party without a commercial interest in Libor? Put
differently, what innate comparative advantages do market participants
such as NYSE Euronext possess in terms of the relatively
straightforward tasks of compiling, verifying the accuracy of, or
disseminating submitted rates? In the absence of a compelling answer
to this question-which neither the Wheatley Review nor the Hogg
Tendering Advisory Committee, which was appointed to select the new
administrator,365 articulated-might we not just be creating another
layer of agency costs? The objective here is not to answer these
questions, but to highlight the fact that they have perhaps received short
shrift in the context of the recent benchmark reform debate.
To date, the new administrator appointed to oversee the Libor
rating-setting process has made significant strides toward improving the
benchmark's internal governance. ICE has established an oversight
committee, which includes representatives from the Federal Reserve
System, Bank of England, and Swiss National Bank.366 It has
reportedly required some banks to provide it with "internal transaction
data," sending a signal that it is serious about verifying submitted rates
against actual interbank transactions as opposed to fuzzy estimates.367 It
is also in the process of developing "new benchmark surveillance
techniques and technology" designed to bring "enhanced transparency"
363 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
364 See supra text accompanying note 356.
365 See Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 357.
366 See Governance: Oversight Committee, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE,
www.theice.com/iba/govemance#iba-oversight-committee (last visited Nov.
17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U6XA-9A6P.
367 Philip Stafford, ICE Prepares Deeper Reform of Libor, FIN. TMIES (July 8,
2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/07d4f4d6-0685-1le4-ba32-
00144feab7de.html.
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to the rate-setting process.368 These are all steps in the right direction-
steps that ICE's predecessor was poorly incentivized to take. It remains
to be seen, however, what the impact of these changes will be over the
longer term.
B. The DC Mechanism
Unlike Libor, the DC mechanism offers a relatively clean slate
upon which to evaluate the merits of potential reforms. Indeed, at first
glance, there exists no shortage of regulatory and governance strategies
that could potentially help ameliorate the hardwired conflicts of interest
and weak governance that render the DC mechanism vulnerable to
opportunistic behavior. While each of these strategies could
theoretically be implemented by ISDA itself, the influence of global
swaps dealers over both ISDA's organizational agenda and the relevant
markets suggest hat, to be truly effective, these strategies would likely
require some sort of public regulatory intervention.369 The first and, in
some respects, most straightforward strategy would be to require DC
members to disclose their trading positions in any reference
obligation.37" The disclosure obligation would be triggered by receipt of
a request for a determination under the DC Rules and then continue in
effect until publication of the final determination.371 Required
disclosure could take the form of detailed position-level information or
simply indicate whether the DC member held a long or short position in
the relevant reference obligation. The second strategy-which could be
employed on its own or in conjunction with the first-would be to
require DC members to report and, if necessary, recuse themselves in
the event of an actual or potential conflict of interest. A third party
removal mechanism could also be employed. Indeed, this is almost
precisely what the DC Rules currently contemplate for expert review
panels.372 In order to render these recusal/removal mechanisms more
368 See ICE Benchmark Administration: Overview, supra note 230.
369 See supra text accompanying note 217.
370 ISDA has stated that "[t]he industiy has made significant progress towards
... full transparency on the positions held.., by DC members" such that it
will be possible to determine whether a DC member is in fact voting its book.
See Determination Committees, supra note 206, at 3-4. In reality, however,
this statement is likely just aspirational.
371 This obligation would thus require public disclosure of any changes in
position during this period.
372 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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effective, DC members could be automatically disqualified from
participating on any DC where their exposure to a reference obligation
exceeded a specified threshold. The third and most radical strategy,
meanwhile, would be to impose reference obligation-specific trading
restrictions on DC members during the period beginning with receipt of
the request for determination and ending with the final determination.
Upon close inspection, each of these strategies manifests
potentially significant trade-offs. Position disclosure, for example,
would impose substantial information costs on both DC members (who
must produce the requisite information) and other market participants
and public regulatory authorities (who must digest this information in
order to generate a credible threat of market-based/regulatory
sanctions). It would also put DC members at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
the remainder of the marketplace by requiring them to disclose
proprietary information, thereby discouraging them from acting as a
dealer at a time when the costs of doing so are already on the rise.
373
Disclosure obligations would also likely incentivize behavior designed
to obscure the nature and extent of these positions. Compounding
matters, it would be difficult to design a disclosure regime that captured
positions in correlated assets that might be used by DC members to
gain (or minimize) exposure to a given reference obligation. Indeed, the
prospect of trading in correlated assets presents similar conceptual
problems for both recusal/removal mechanisms and trading restrictions.
The imposition of trading restrictions, meanwhile, would serve to
suffocate dealer-intermediated markets, leaving market participants
with even fewer trading options. Moreover, insofar as trading
restrictions render DC members vulnerable to market movements
which occur during the restricted period, they may have an adverse
impact on a firm's overall financial position and, in extremis, financial
stability. Ultimately, these costs may be significant, and must be
weighed against the expected benefits associated with these strategies.
Fortunately, there exists a fourth and intuitively more desirable
strategy. Rather than focusing on the rules by which DC members must
abide when making decisions, why not focus on the identity of the
decision-makers themselves? More specifically, why not simply
allocate decision-making authority to parties who-unlike global
derivatives dealers-are not inherently conflicted? In answering this
373 This is the result of refonns such as the Volcker Rule and the Basel III
capital adequacy framework. For more information on these and other refonns
and their impact on the market making functions of dealers, see Armour et al.,
supra note 47.
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question, it is worth pointing out that the DC Rules already envision
just such a class of independent parties: the external reviewers
nominated by ISDA members to resolve determinations where the
requisite supermajority threshold is not reached.374 Moreover, the DC
Rules already include disclosure, recusal, and removal mechanisms for
external reviewers in the event of actual or perceived conflicts of
interest.375 Taking a page from the Wheatley Review, this internal
governance mechanism could be augmented by introducing civil and
criminal penalties for manipulating determinations, and by designating
determinations as a controlled function (or its equivalent) under the
relevant approved persons regime.376 Together, these reforms would
reduce-if not altogether eliminate-the opportunities for abuse, and
improve both ex ante vetting and ex post monitoring and enforcement
by public regulatory authorities.
A second variant of this strategy would be to allocate
responsibility for determinations to in-house legal counsel employed by
DC members. Indeed, at least two DC members-and perhaps others-
already employ this strategy.377 Intuitively, the threat of sanctions from
the relevant professional licensing bodies (e.g. the New York State Bar
Association or the United Kingdom Solicitors Regulatory Authority)
would help reinforce existing governance arrangements. This threat
could be further reinforced by ensuring that firms adhered to strict
ethical firewalls governing the flow of information between the legal
and trading functions by mandating disclosure of the identities of the
individuals acting as DC members and, once again, by designating
these activities as controlled functions (or their equivalents) under the
relevant public regulatory regime.
The key to understanding the desirability of this strategy
resides in the acknowledgement hat the most important decisions made
by DC members are essentially matters of contractual interpretation.
Specifically, the question of whether a credit, restructuring, or other
event has occurred requires DC members to review the relevant
provisions of ISDA's credit derivatives documentation and determine
whether they apply to a given set of facts.378 That these determinations
171 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
376 See supra notes 345, 352 and accompanying text.
377 This assertion is based on the Author's personal coriespondence with
market participants.
378 See supra text accompanying notes 183-84. At the same time, it is these
decisions-along with those relating to the governance of the DC mechanism
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are effectively legal in nature is reflected by the fact that at least some
DC members already delegate this task to counsel.379 In this important
respect, global derivatives dealers do not possess an innate comparative
advantage over, say, commercial lawyers, legal academics, or
independent financial professionals with experience designing, drafting,
or negotiating ISDA credit derivatives documentation.3 0 As a result,
there exists no shortage of fundamentally less conflicted, sufficiently
expert parties who could perform essentially the same function as
current DC members. Of course, the processes reflected in the current
DC Rules would need to change in order to ensure that these new
decision-makers could render determinations within the same expedited
timeframes as existing DCs. A new appeals mechanism would also
need to be developed. This, however, seems like a small price to pay to
ameliorate the acute agency problems that threaten to undermine
confidence in the current DC mechanism.
In the end, the technical details of these strategies, while
clearly important, are not the principal takeaways from this Article.
Financial markets will continue to change, and so too must the
governance and regulatory strategies used to address market failures.
Instead, the principal takeaways relate to how we approach the
regulation of private market structures. As a preliminary matter, public
regulatory authorities must have the legal authority to assert jurisdiction
over market structures such as Libor and the DC mechanism, as well as
organizations such as the BBA and ISDA.381 They must also have wide
itself-that are also arguably the ones most prone to abuse under this strategy.
In many cases, lawyers are likely to have less of a competitive advantage in
terms of questions surrounding whether to hold an auction and what reference
obligations it should include.
311 See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
380 See, e.g., About Us, PANEL RECOGNIZED INT'L MARKET EXPERTS FIN.,
http://primefinancedisputes.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/A2LD-BNLP ("A guiding principal [sic] of the organization
is independence, which will distinguish it from industry associations and other
financial market participants.").
381 Notably, prosecutions against panel banks for manipulating Libor have been
brought by both financial conduct and antitrust authorities, along with agencies
such as the DOJ, U.K. Serious Fraud Office, and Dutch National Public
Prosecutor's Office. See Antitrust Division Enters into First Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (English, Japanese & Chinese), CADWALADER,
WICKERSHAM & TAvr LLP (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.cadwalader.com/
resources/clients-friends-memos/antitmst-division-enters-into-first-deferred-
prosecution-agreement, archived at http://pema.cc/H2M3-3VJD; supra note
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ranging enforcement powers to deter and, where necessary, punish
misconduct. More important than this formal legal authority, however,
is a willingness on the part of these authorities to use this authority to
proactively generate a credible threat of regulatory intervention. This
threat is necessary to compensate for the absence of market-based
sanctions stemming from the existence of positive network
externalities, path dependency, and market power. Simultaneously,
generating a credible threat of regulatory intervention requires that
authorities allocate their scarce resources in ways that maximize the
probability of identifying market structures that may be vulnerable to
abuse. Indeed, beyond Libor and the DC mechanism, there are a great
many other market structures-e.g. foreign exchange benchmarks ,32
the London gold fix,3 8 3 and so-called "dark pools, 38 4 - where the limits
of private ordering may result in market failure. By identifying where
these limits are present and evaluating their impact, public regulatory
authorities may be able to more effectively target these resources
toward where they are likely to yield the greatest impact.
VII. Conclusion
We do not generally think it is a good idea to permit judges to
have a material interest in the cases they hear, to let students grade their
own exams, or to allow referees to place bets on the sporting events
3815they officiate. The salient question thus becomes: is there a
270 and accompanying text. Questions surrounding which of these authorities
is best positioned to oversee private market structures is beyond the scope of
this Article.
382 See Rigging Currency Markets: The FX Is in, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013, at
88, 88.
383 See Nicholas Larkin, No Clear Evidence of Gold Manipulation Seen by
UK's FCA, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2014, 11:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-07-02/fca-sees-no -clear-evidence-of-manipulation-during-
gold.html, archived at http://perima.cc/NM8G-734L; Eric Onstad, Gold Price
Benchmark Open to Manipulation: London Metal Exchange CEO, REUTERS
(June 10, 2014, 9:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/10/gold-
fix-lme-idUSL5NOOQ3S420140610, archived at http://perma.cc/U8S5-
GBKF; Liam Vaughan, Gold Fix Study Shows Signs of Decade of Bank
Manipulation, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-02-28/gold-fix-study-shows-signs-of-decade-of-bank-
manipulation.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YA6K-Y7QJ.
384 See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 42 (2014).
385 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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compelling reason to treat powerful financial intermediaries differently
from these other delegated decision-makers to whom we grant, often
enormous, discretion? A priori, there seems little justification for
allocating virtually unconstrained discretion to these intermediaries to
adjudicate issues that determine the payoffs under contracts-often
worth millions of dollars-to which they are themselves counterparties.
Within a perfectly competitive marketplace, this equilibrium would
seem unlikely to take hold. In an opaque, concentrated, and
intermediated market characterized by positive network externalities,
path dependence, and power imbalances, however, all bets are off The
key question in such cases is whether the existing constellation of
internal and external governance mechanisms adequately constrain the
information, agency, coordination, and other costs at the heart of these
market structures. In the case of Libor, the answer was a clear and
resounding no.386 Perhaps the only difference in the case of the DC
mechanism is that, rather than picking up the pieces, there is still scope
to take meaningful preventative action-and we should.
386 See supra Part IV.
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